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I. Introduction 
Delaware Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster suggested in his 
decision In re Revlon Inc. Shareholders Litigation1 that “if boards 
of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum 
would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute 
resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter 
provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”2 
Since Revlon was decided on March 16, 2010, over 195 Delaware 
corporations, including 27 in the S&P 500, have followed the Vice 
Chancellor’s suggestion and adopted a forum selection clause in 
their governing documents.3 
Vice Chancellor Laster’s suggestion is a response to the 
perceived two-pronged problem of (1) duplicative litigation over 
corporate transactions in Delaware and other forums and 
(2) other state courts applying Delaware law.4 From the 
viewpoint of a Delaware corporation, both prongs are 
problematic. First, duplicative litigation is more expensive than 
litigation in a single state and may even result in a split decision, 
                                                                                                     
 1. See In re Revlon Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 961 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(holding that plaintiff’s lead counsel’s efforts to litigate the case had been 
inadequate and replacing the firm with a new lead counsel). 
 2. Id. at 960. 
 3. Claudia H. Allen, Study of Delaware Forum Selection in Charters and 
Bylaws 1 (Jan. 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (finding that 195 Delaware 
corporations have adopted a forum selection clause as of December 31, 2011) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Corporations are governed by a 
charter and bylaws, which together make up a corporation’s governing 
documents. See ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CLOSELY HELD 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 278–79 (2007). 
 4. While the inverse—Delaware applying another state’s law—is also 
problematic because Delaware’s corporate law is universally accepted as the 
most highly developed corporate case law, the application of Delaware’s law is a 
larger problem than the inverse. 
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with one state’s court system siding with the corporation and the 
other state’s court system siding with the plaintiff.5 Second, other 
state courts applying Delaware law is—as one litigator has put 
it—“like taking Gallatorie’s secret recipes and giving them to a 
Jack-In-The-Box short-order cook. It doesn’t always work so 
well.”6 While this statement shows the very high regard in which 
Delaware lawyers hold Delaware judges, this statement also 
illustrates the advantage of a system in which only the courts of 
the state whose law is to be interpreted rule on that law.7 
This Note will argue that corporations and society in general 
are detrimentally affected by plaintiffs’ bar filing in multiple 
jurisdictions against a single action or transaction; that Delaware 
corporations should enact a forum selection clause to protect 
themselves from these useless expenses; and that courts should 
enforce these clauses. 
Part II will open by examining the evidence that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are choosing to file their cases against Delaware 
corporations outside of Delaware and will look at several 
explanations of their motivation in doing so. It will then argue 
that this trend is detrimental to corporate defendants and society 
in general. It will then examine the strength and utility of the 
internal affairs doctrine and forum non conveniens in preventing 
duplicative litigation. 
Part III will propose the use of choice of forum clauses as the 
best potential solution to the aforementioned problem. This Note 
will examine the policy underlying choice of forum clauses. It will 
then examine the legal history of forum selection clauses in 
federal and Delaware courts. It will then discuss the likelihood of 
enforcement in both federal and state courts and the arguments 
                                                                                                     
 5. Claims in multiple states are a common occurrence. A partner with 
New York-based firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz estimates that 50% of 
mergers and acquisitions transactions by Delaware-incorporated companies 
caused lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions. William Savitt, Exclusive Venue 
Provisions For Corporate Cases, NAT’L L.J., June 7, 2010, at 10. 
 6. Anywhere But Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests 
Some Solutions, M&A J., May 2007, at 17. 
 7. Of course, this statement ignores the response that the American 
judicial system allows the plaintiff to choose where to sue because failure to do 
so might prevent the plaintiff from having his day in court. This 
counterargument will be considered later in the Note. See infra Part III.A 
(discussing the policy behind forum selection clauses). 
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that should be made in a clause’s favor in different courts. It will 
look at the previous use of these clauses by corporations, and will 
discuss the different choices that a corporation must make in 
drafting a proposed forum selection clause. 
II. Problem of Cases Increasingly Decided Outside the State of 
Incorporation 
A. Evidence of Plaintiffs Fleeing Delaware Jurisdiction 
Delaware commentators have consistently found that cases 
involving Delaware corporations are increasingly being decided 
outside of Delaware courts.8 A study of venue choice was 
conducted by John Armour, Bernard Black, and Brian Cheffins, 
who examined corporate law claims brought against directors of 
Delaware public corporations that resulted in written decisions 
from 1995 to 2009 and tracked the percentage of these decisions 
issued by Delaware courts, other state courts, and federal courts.9 
The study found that the number of written Delaware court 
opinions remained steady throughout the period, but the 
percentage of all written opinions in the field that were issued by 
Delaware courts declined slowly from a high of 80% in 1995 to 
65% in 2002. During 2005–2009, however, Delaware’s share had 
dropped precipitously to an average of 31% of cases involving 
claims against directors of Delaware public corporations.10 
                                                                                                     
 8. See, e.g., John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s 
Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1351–64 (2012) [hereinafter Armour et al., 
Balancing Act]; John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware 
Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter 
Armour et al., Losing Cases], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578404; 
Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 
349, 350 (2012); Brian M. Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and 
Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 143–56 
(2011). 
 9. Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1353. The study included 
written decisions only because the authors wanted to focus on the significant 
decisions that would make a difference in the richness and value of Delaware 
law as precedent. See id. at 1353–54 (stating that written decisions were a 
“crude” proxy for determining whether Delaware’s rich body of precedent was 
under threat). 
 10. Id. at 1354. The study shows a surprising growth of federal court 
opinions. The authors posit that this growth may have occurred due to the 
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Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is one area in which this 
trend is most pronounced. A study of merger transactions by 
Brian Quinn revealed the same trend away from Delaware found 
by Armour, Black, and Cheffins.11 Quinn examined 119 merger 
transactions of more than $100 million that involved solvent 
Delaware public corporations.12 Of 119 transactions, ninety-seven 
(82%) had subsequent merger-related litigation.13 Of those 
transactions with subsequent litigation, eighty-two (85%) 
involved multiple lawsuits, with an average of 5.3 per 
transaction.14 In addition, of those transactions that involved 
subsequent litigation, fifty were litigated in multiple 
jurisdictions.15 Forty percent of the cases were litigated 
exclusively outside of Delaware.16 
Jennifer Johnson conducted a similar study in 2010 by 
tracking in which forum M&A plaintiffs brought their claims. 
Johnson found that, of 193 M&A defendants incorporated in 
Delaware, roughly 40% of cases were filed in Delaware, another 
40% were filed in other state courts, and the remaining 20% were 
filed in federal courts.17 
In their study on venue choice, Armour, Black, and Cheffins 
also examined the twenty-five largest merger transactions each 
                                                                                                     
number of federal securities claims and the availability of supplemental 
jurisdiction that allows plaintiffs to attach these claims to claims over which the 
federal courts have jurisdiction. 
 11. Compare id. at 1358 (noting the trend away from Delaware, although 
expressing uncertainty when it began), with Quinn, supra note 8, at 148 tbl.2 
(finding the same trend away from Delaware in public company mergers 
litigation). 
 12. Quinn, supra note 8, at 147. The study excluded buybacks, exchange 
offers, and partial acquisitions. Id. at 147 n.35. 
 13. Id. at 148 tbl.1.  
 14. Id. at 148 tbl.2; see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 372 fig.7 (comparing 
state class action filings in the M&A context with federal class actions in the 
same context). 
 15. Quinn, supra note 8, at 148 tbl.2. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 374 fig.8 (finding that, of 193 M&A filings 
against defendants incorporated in Delaware, 103 were filed in Delaware, 115 
were filed in other states, and 47 were filed in federal court). Johnson’s study 
also shows a marked increase in M&A litigation in federal court during 2009 
and 2010. See id. at 372 fig.7 (comparing the number of claims brought in state 
courts against the number of claims brought in federal court). 
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year during 1994–2009.18 These large mergers are what 
Stevelman describes as the “crown jewels” and “the most value-
producing ‘brands’ in Delaware corporate law.”19 Of the 400 
transactions studied, 256 involved companies incorporated in 
Delaware,20 and shareholders filed suit in 121 of 256 transactions 
(47%).21 Between 1994 and 2001, litigation contesting these 
mergers was filed in Delaware an average of 69% of the time.22 
After 2001, the average dropped to 31%.23 
The study also notes that, prior to 2001, Delaware routinely 
hosted at least part of the litigation in any given case and was 
often the exclusive forum. Indeed, in 2001, Delaware provided the 
exclusive forum for all twenty-five mergers that the study 
examined during that year.24 After 2001, however, Delaware 
became one of many forums, and, in roughly half of the cases 
studied, plaintiffs did not use Delaware’s courts at all.25 Although 
the trend of completely excluding Delaware has shifted back 
significantly—only 20% of M&A litigation over the twenty-five 
largest transactions during 2009 was exclusively outside of 
Delaware26—Delaware no longer regularly serves as the exclusive 
forum. In 2009, none of the twenty-five M&A transaction disputes 
were litigated exclusively in Delaware, even when many of the 
transactions included Delaware-incorporated companies.27 
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) are another context in which the 
“flight from Delaware” has been found. Armour, Black, and 
Cheffins again provided the initial study. They studied 477 
LBOs28 that occurred from 1995 to 2009, of which 300 involved 
                                                                                                     
 18. Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1356. Armour, Black, and 
Cheffins studied the twenty-five largest mergers of publicly held, U.S.-based 
companies as measured by transaction value. Id. 
 19. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and 
Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 74, 127 (2009). 
 20. Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1356. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1357. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1358 fig.5. 
 25. Id. at 1358. 
 26. Id. at 1358 fig.5. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Armour, Black, and Cheffins only considered those public companies 
that had filings on EDGAR. Id. at 1359. 
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buyouts of Delaware corporations.29 Of these 300 LBO 
transactions, 141 (47%) resulted in litigation.30 Although the 
authors note that the frequency of LBOs rose or fell with market 
cycles, 73% of all LBO-related litigation filed before 2001 was 
filed in Delaware.31 From 2002 to 2009, only 45% of LBO-related 
litigation involving a Delaware corporation was filed in 
Delaware.32 For LBO-related litigation, however, the alternative 
venues were other state courts, not federal courts.33 
Options backdating litigation formed the third area of study 
for Armour, Black and Cheffins.34 They identified 127 Delaware 
corporations that faced 234 option backdating lawsuits asserting 
breach of fiduciary duty claims.35 Of these lawsuits, only 26 (11%) 
were brought in Delaware, while 115 (49%) lawsuits were 
brought in federal courts, and another 93 (40%) actions were 
brought in state courts other than Delaware.36 Compared to 
mergers and LBOs, the amount of options litigation in federal 
court is extremely high, but this is explained by the fact that 
options backdating cases generally meet federal diversity 
requirements.37 The point is, however, that breach of fiduciary 
                                                                                                     
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1360. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1360 & fig.7. 
 34. Option backdating occurs when the corporation gives an option to 
purchase stock to its directors or officers but falsifies records to show that the 
option was granted earlier when the stock price was lower. By backdating the 
grant of the option, the corporation did not have to report as compensation the 
difference between the exercise price (the market value on the date that the 
corporation supposedly gave the option) and the share’s market value on the 
date when the executive exercises the option. This resulted in improper 
accounting and tax treatment, which in turn led to false compensation reports.  
See Christy L. Abbott, Comment, The Shareholder Derivative Suit as a Response 
to Stock Option Backdating, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 593, 597 (2009) (defining option 
backdating); Armour et al., Losing Cases, supra note 8, at 14. Armour, Black 
and Cheffins state that they chose options backdating because it was derivative 
litigation, not direct litigation like mergers and LBOs. See Armour et al., 
Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1362. 
 35. Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1363.  
 36. Id. 
 37. While plaintiffs also could bring an options backdating case as a 
securities class action, the derivative claims—as opposed to the disclosure 
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duty claims in option backdating cases could have been litigated 
in Delaware but were not. Like mergers and LBOs, option 
backdating litigation moved increasingly away from Delaware. 
B. Why Are Plaintiffs Fleeing Delaware? 
Although both commentators and Delaware judges agree that 
there is a trend away from Delaware, it is not clear why the trend 
is occurring. This Note will examine several possible reasons for 
this trend. 
The first theory is that the plaintiffs’ bar believes that 
Delaware, particularly the Court of Chancery, is too “pro-
management” to provide a fair forum.38 They may base this belief 
on several opinions from the Court of Chancery, especially those 
from Chancellor Leo Strine and Vice Chancellor Laster. In his 
opinion In re Cox Communications Inc. Shareholder Litigation,39 
Chancellor Strine expressed his doubts about the true utility of 
the plaintiffs’ bar, criticizing its members’ tendency to follow 
takeover announcements with “hastily-filed, first-day complaints 
that serve no purpose other than for a particular law firm and its 
client to get into the medal round of the filing speed (also 
formerly known as the lead counsel selection) Olympics.”40  
Vice Chancellor Laster has also expressed frustration with 
several shareholder suits brought by the plaintiffs’ bar. In Revlon, 
he took control of the case away from lead counsel, finding that 
                                                                                                     
claims under federal law—were more popular because a federal action under 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 must allege a “material” misstatement. Armour et al., Losing 
Cases, supra note 8, at 15; see also Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive 
Practices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).  
 38. Some plaintiffs’ attorneys who responded to Armour, Black and 
Cheffins admitted that they preferred to avoid Delaware, but these were 
counterbalanced by those who always filed in Delaware and those who preferred 
to take a case-by-case approach. See Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, 
at 1350.  
 39. In re Cox Comms., Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 642 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (holding that the appropriate attorney fee award was $1.275 million 
rather than $4.95 million as agreed to in the settlement because the attorneys 
had not sufficiently contributed to the favorable settlement to merit the higher 
award and the hours worked were excessive). 
 40. Id. at 608. 
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the firm had not adequately represented its client.41 The Vice 
Chancellor took the opportunity to comment further:  
The resulting system involves little real litigation activity, 
generates questionable benefits for class members, provides 
transaction-wide releases for defendants, and offers a good 
living for the traditional plaintiffs’ bar. In a legal system that 
values representative litigation as a positive force, the 
business model of filing and free-riding has nothing to 
commend it.42 
Laster has maintained this stance in other cases. During a 
conference for the case In re Compellent Technologies,43 the Vice 
Chancellor complained to the firms competing to be named lead 
counsel that “[t]he whole problem is the diversion of interests 
between entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ counsel and the class. You all 
maximize by getting the most fee for the least work.”44 On 
another occasion, he criticized typical takeover suits, saying “[a] 
lot of these sue-on-every-deal cases are . . . worthless, they’re 
simply we see the announcement, then we file,” and even 
appointed special counsel to investigate possible collusion 
between plaintiffs and defense counsel in the case.45 
In a system in which the plaintiffs’ bar depends on 
contingency fees from cases that the judge may dismiss and 
settlements that the judge must approve, the use of words such 
as “questionable benefits” and “free-riding” by the Vice 
Chancellor must worry the plaintiffs’ bar. It is unlikely, however, 
that words of frustration from two members of the Chancery 
would be enough to cause the widespread flight from Delaware, 
especially when the complaints are limited to takeover cases. 
While these opinions may be part of the reason why plaintiffs are 
more reluctant to file in Delaware, something more is at work. 
                                                                                                     
 41. In re Revlon Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 958 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 42. Id. at 959–60. 
 43. In re Compellent Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6084-VCL, 2011 WL 
6382523, at *28 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011) (finding that plaintiffs’ lawyers gained 
significant results in settlement that resulted in modification of deal protection 
provisions and rescission of the Rights Plan and awarding $2.3 million in 
attorney’s fees, but finding that the supplemental disclosures settlement was 
not significant and awarding only $100,000 in attorney fees). 
 44. In re Compellent Technologies, C.A. No. 6084-VCL *7 (Jan. 13, 2011).  
 45. Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Courtroom Status Conference 
*16 (Del. Ch., December 17, 2010).  
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A second possibility explaining why plaintiffs are filing in 
forums other than Delaware is what Chancellor Strine derisively 
called the “filing speed . . . Olympics”46 and the selection of lead 
counsel. In most states, the first firm to file a lawsuit against the 
defendant corporation regarding the litigated transaction gained 
an advantage in the race to become lead counsel, with its 
attendant financial rewards.47 In Delaware, however, the 
Chancery has shifted to an approach similar to lead counsel 
selection in federal securities cases.48 Former Chancellor William 
Chandler quantified this approach by identifying three factors 
that Delaware courts should consider when appointing lead 
counsel: the quality of the pleadings, the energy and enthusiasm 
demonstrated by the various attorneys, and the size of the 
economic stake each plaintiff has in the litigation.49 Armour, 
Black, and Cheffins found that this approach resulted in giving 
priority to firms who have an elite reputation, have successfully 
represented clients in the past, and currently represent clients 
with a significant stake in the litigation.50 
This rule likely supports plaintiffs’ firms mainly based in 
Delaware at the expense of outside firms that might not be as 
specialized or experienced in takeover litigation. An outside firm 
that is in a position to win the race to file is much more likely to 
file in a state that follows the “filing speed Olympics” than in 
Delaware, where it would be much less certain—perhaps even 
unlikely—that the firm would have the reputation, quality, or 
client to compete with the specialized corporate firms. 
A final theory on why plaintiffs’ attorneys are filing outside 
of Delaware is that Delaware is more likely than other 
                                                                                                     
 46. In re Cox Comms., Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 608 (Del. Ch. 
2005). 
 47. Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of 
Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 656 (2002) (criticizing the 
lack of transparency in the lead counsel selection process). 
 48. Compare TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., 2000 
WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (listing the Chancery’s factors for 
consideration when appointing lead plaintiff), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) 
(giving the factors used to find the “most adequate plaintiff”) (2012). 
 49. TCW Tech., 2000 WL 1654504, at *4. 
 50. See Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1374 (analyzing 
Chancellor Chandler’s discussion in TCW Tech for criteria for appointing lead 
counsel).  
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jurisdictions to closely scrutinize and slash attorneys’ fees when 
the judge believes such action is appropriate. Delaware courts 
base attorneys’ fees on the relief obtained rather than the hours 
worked, which is the primary test in most states.51 The Delaware 
approach was considered the more generous to the plaintiffs’ 
bar,52 but beginning in 2001, Delaware courts have routinely 
slashed plaintiff-side attorneys’ fees in high-profile cases.  
In 2001, former Chancellor Chandler cut a $24.75 million fee 
to $12.3 million after the firm gained a $180 million settlement 
for shareholders.53 In 2005, Vice Chancellor Strine in Cox 
Communications sua sponte reduced the attorney fee by 75%, 
even though the defendants had not objected to the fee during 
settlement.54 During the same year, Vice Chancellor Stephen 
Lamb reduced the fee in a takeover case to 28% of the proposed 
fee.55 In 2010, Vice Chancellor Donald Parsons, during his 
decision In re Cox Radio,56 reduced a proposed $3.6 million fee to 
$490,000,57 and Vice Chancellor Laster in Brinkhoff v. Texas 
Eastern Products Pipeline Co.58 reduced a proposed $19.5 million 
fee to $10 million, even though he acknowledged that the firm 
had expended significant efforts in the litigation.59  
                                                                                                     
 51. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group 
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 497 (1987) (describing 
the approach taken by Delaware on attorneys’ fees, as established in Dann v. 
Chrysler Corp., 215 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1965), aff’d, 223 A.2d 384 (Del. 1966)); 
see also Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980) (defining 
Delaware’s approach to attorneys’ fees).  
 52. Macey & Miller, supra note 51, at 497. 
 53. Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 8, at 1371. 
 54. See In re Cox Comms., Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 640–42 (Del. 
Ch. 2005) (finding that plaintiffs’ attorneys took no appreciable risk and did 
little productive work, and therefore awarded a fee of $1.275 million instead of 
the requested $4.95 million). 
 55. See In re Instinet Grp. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A 1289-N, 2005 WL 
3501708, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 14, 2005) (reducing the attorneys’ fees from $1.623 
million to $450,000). 
 56. In re Cox Radio Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 4461-VCP, 2010 WL 1806616, 
at *23 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Brinckerhoff v. Tex. E. Prods. Pipeline Co., 986 A.2d 370, 396 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (approving settlement as fair and reasonable, awarding $10 million in fees 
and expenses to plaintiffs’ counsel, and awarding $80,000 in fees and expenses 
to objectors’ counsel). 
 59. See id. (acknowledging plaintiffs’ counsel’s substantial efforts and 
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Each of these interrelated theories has some merit, and the 
answer is probably a mixture of each. It is most likely, however, 
that the “flight from Delaware” is motivated primarily by the 
reduced attorney fees, especially in cases that the Chancellor and 
Vice Chancellors are likely to view as weak or frivolous, and 
therefore likely to award very limited attorney’s fees. 
C. Is the “Flight from Delaware” Harmful? 
At this point, the reader might naturally feel indifferent as to 
whether corporate law cases are decided in Delaware, another 
state, federal courts, or all of the above. Indeed, from a litigation 
viewpoint, the effect of forum selection seems only to touch the 
plaintiff and defendant, with the winner at best gaining a 
favorable jurisdiction in which to bring his case. This hardly 
seems something for a judge or the legislature to view with 
alarm. When considered from an economic perspective, however, 
the view becomes radically different. Most of the defending 
corporations are public and sell stock to the general public,60 
which means that these shareholders—and thus the general 
public—profit or suffer losses according to the corporations’ 
fortunes. While the fact that corporations sell stock to the general 
public should not insinuate that corporations should be above the 
                                                                                                     
finding that counsel’s efforts created an asset worth $100 million but reducing 
fee to $10 million). There are signs that the Court of Chancery has realized that 
this may be a reason why the plaintiffs’ bar has filed in other jurisdictions and 
is moving to counteract this trend. For example, Chancellor Strine recently 
awarded attorney fees of $304 million (15%) in a securities derivative suit. In re 
S. Peru Copper Corp., No. 961-CS, 2011 WL 6382006, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 
2011), vacated, 2011 WL 6476919 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2011). Commentators agree 
that Strine sought to send a message to the plaintiffs’ bar that Delaware is still 
willing to award large fees for plaintiffs’ lawyers who take large risks that pay 
off. See Alison Frankel, Record $285 ml Fee Is Strine’s Message to Plaintiffs’ Bar, 
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Dec. 20, 2011), http://newsandinsight. 
thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/ViewNews.aspx?id=35135&terms=@ReutersTo
picCodes+CONTAINS+’ANV’ (last visited Nov, 14, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 60. This is especially true for Delaware companies, which make up 63% of 
the Fortune 500 and more than 50% of all U.S. publicly traded companies. 
Delaware Division of Corporations, Why Choose Delaware as Your Corporate 
Home?, http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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law—this would create even greater harm to society—it does 
mean that courts and legislatures should take action to prevent a 
corporation from being forced to spend money to defend against 
duplicative litigation, which requires more money to be spent on 
litigation to obtain the same result in multiple jurisdictions. As 
Vice Chancellor Laster noted: 
Litigation is costly. So if you could envision this totality of 
stockholders, they would not want to sue willy-nilly and 
impose on their company the costs of defending multiple 
actions in multiple fora, where the cost of briefing on just a 
motion to dismiss, when you have experienced counsel from 
big firms, can approach seven figures. It’s real money.61 
The additional money spent on litigation would otherwise be 
available for dividends or improvements to grow the company. In 
addition, society must be taxed to pay for two courts to listen to 
the same dispute and perhaps issue divergent opinions, which in 
turn might produce additional opinions that attempt to 
consolidate the first two opinions. As a result, society suffers 
when litigation is not pursued efficiently in a single forum. 
Once it is acknowledged that single-forum litigation is the 
most beneficial to society, the question then becomes: which 
forum? This Note will argue that the state of incorporation should 
provide the forum for cases involving its corporations.  
First, each state has a competitive advantage over all other 
states in applying its law. Because of Delaware’s highly 
developed corporate precedent, Delaware is a good example of a 
state that has a competitive advantage in applying its own law.62 
Ted Mirvis stated:  
We can talk . . . in the Delaware courts about p2p and 
Footnote 10 of Caremark and how Revlon duties intersect with 
the Unocal scrutiny and the double helix of Siliconix . . . [but 
for a judge outside of Delaware] it can be a little unnerving. I 
mean, you say, “Here’s five recent decisions each of which are 
                                                                                                     
 61. Transcript of Record at 50:21–51:3, La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. 
Pyott et. al., Case No. 595-VCL, Tr. at 50:21–51:3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 2011) 
(Laster, V.C.). 
 62. See Joseph Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate 
Litigation: Mandatory and Elective Approaches 16 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate 
Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 91, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690561. 
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94 pages long and you read those five decisions and you can 
sort of get a basic idea of the vocabulary.”63  
The Chancellor and Vice Chancellors in the Court of Chancery 
spend the vast majority of their time deciding corporate law 
cases, and thus have an overwhelming competitive advantage due 
to their familiarity with Delaware corporate law cases.64 
Additionally, the court has streamlined procedures that help to 
provide both plaintiffs and defendants with relatively quick 
decisions. 65 Most importantly, the court has the advantage of 
understanding the policies and purposes behind Delaware 
corporate law because of the court’s in-depth familiarity gained 
through constant use and application. Out-of-state courts, on the 
other hand, are not as familiar with Delaware’s corporate law, 
and, without the advantage of familiarity gained through 
constant exposure, they are less able to comprehensively grasp 
the policies and details of judicially defined doctrines that would 
cause a chancellor or vice chancellor to decide in favor of one 
party.66 
The same logic applies with much the same force to other 
states applying their own corporate law, especially those with 
specialized courts that gain comprehensive knowledge of the 
state’s corporate and business law. The nineteen states67 that 
                                                                                                     
 63. Mirvis, supra note 6, at 17.  
 64. See Allen, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that the Delaware courts have 
developed considerable experience in dealing with corporate law issues). 
 65. See Claudia H. Allen, Study of Delaware Forum Selection in Charters 
and Bylaws, at iv (Apr. 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Allen 
2011] (describing policy arguments in proxy statements supporting forum 
selection clauses requiring Delaware as forum) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 66. As one attorney said: “What I tell clients is that even though Delaware 
law is being applied, when it’s being applied by a bench that doesn’t have as 
much familiarity with these cases, the predictability goes down.” David Marcus, 
Did Chancery Fee Rulings Chase Away Plaintiffs Lawyers?, DEL. L. WKLY., Nov. 
29, 2006, http://www.delawarelawweekly.com/news.php?news_id=109, (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 67. See John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Inter-State Competition 1 (Univ. of 
N.C. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 1928108, 2011) (listing the different states 
that have established business and complex litigation courts in the past twenty 
years). These include North Carolina and New Jersey (1996), Pennsylvania, 
Massachusetts, and Nevada (2000), Rhode Island (2001), Maryland (2002), Florida 
(2004), Georgia (2005), Colorado and Oregon (2006), South Carolina (2007), Maine, 
New Hampshire, and Ohio (2008), and Alabama and Delaware (2010). Id. 
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have created business courts in the last two decades share this 
competitive advantage to a greater or lesser extent, based on the 
degree that their case law and statutes are highly developed. 
Even the remaining states where corporate cases are heard by 
courts of general jurisdiction retain a competitive advantage in 
deciding their own corporate law, simply by virtue of the fact that 
they are more likely to hear cases involving that state’s 
corporation law than out-of-state courts. 
Because duplicative litigation wastes society’s resources and 
the best forum to decide cases involving the corporation’s internal 
affairs is the state of incorporation, the legislature and judiciary 
have provided two doctrines that attempt to address the 
situation. This Note will show, however, that the internal affairs 
and forum non conveniens doctrines do not adequately address 
the problem, and will propose that forum selection clauses be 
utilized by companies and be upheld by the judiciary and 
legislature as the device that best addresses this problem of 
waste. 
D. Internal Affairs Doctrine 
Two doctrines govern the choice of law and forum for cases 
involving the relationship between a corporation and its officers, 
directors, and shareholders. The internal affairs doctrine is a 
specific doctrine that applies only to the corporation’s internal 
affairs, governs the choice of law, and requires that, except in a 
very unusual case, the law of the state of incorporation applies.68 
Forum non conveniens, the second doctrine, is a broader doctrine 
that applies in all cases and affects the choice of forum by 
allowing courts to refuse to accept jurisdiction over a case that is 
in a proper forum but would be inconvenient,69 although modern 
courts have generally regarded this choice as one of convenience 
and discretion.70 
                                                                                                     
 68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971) 
(defining internal affairs doctrine). 
 69. 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828 (3d ed. 2011). 
 70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 313 (1971), 
Reporters Note (noting that the modern trend is that “jurisdiction will be 
exercised unless considerations of convenience or of efficiency or of justice point 
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The internal affairs doctrine (IAD) is a judicial doctrine that 
recognizes that ordinarily the state of incorporation’s law must be 
applied to regulate the internal affairs of a corporation, which is 
defined as the relationship between the corporation and its 
current officers, directors, and shareholders.71 The policy behind 
the doctrine is to promote certainty in the law for a corporation 
that might otherwise be faced with contradictory demands from 
the federal government and different state governments.72 Thus, 
as a general matter, the law of the state of incorporation will 
govern cases that involve the internal affairs of a corporation.73 
The latest cases from the United States Supreme Court on 
the subject support the assertion that each state has clear and (at 
least implicitly) exclusive authority over its domestic 
corporations. For example, in Cort v. Ash,74 Justice Brennan 
stated: “Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors 
commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding 
that, except where federal law expressly requires certain 
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law 
will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”75 A decade 
                                                                                                     
to the courts of the state of incorporation as the appropriate tribunals”). 
 71. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (finding that Illinois 
has an interest in regulating the internal affairs of a domestic corporation, but 
finding that interest insufficient to allow the state to impose a substantial 
burden on interstate commerce); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 302(2) (1971) (“The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied 
to determine such issues, except in the unusual case where, with respect to the 
particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the 
occurrence and the parties . . . .”). 
 72. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645 (noting that without the IAD, a corporation 
might otherwise be “faced with conflicting demands”). 
 73. See, e.g., Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123, 133 (1933) 
(“When, by acquisition of his stock, plaintiff became a member of the corporation 
he, like every other shareholder, impliedly agreed that, in respect of its internal 
affairs, the company was to be governed by the laws of the state in which it was 
organized.”). 
 74. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975) (holding derivative suit with 
regard to the alleged violation of law prohibiting corporate involvement in 
election campaigns cannot be impliedly authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 610, and 
any remedy must be under Delaware’s corporation law), abrogated on other 
grounds by Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), and 
Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). 
 75. Id. 
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later, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,76 Justice 
Powell reiterated that “[n]o principle of corporate law and 
practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to 
regulate domestic corporations.”77 Implicit in the Court’s 
statement is the assertion that it is not within other states’ 
authority to regulate corporations that have been incorporated in 
other states. 
From the standpoint of a corporation seeking certainty in the 
application of state law, however, there are two problems with 
the IAD. First, a state court may refuse to follow the IAD in 
extreme circumstances.78 For example, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court declared in Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade79 that it 
would base a decision whether to apply the IAD on “whether the 
contacts of one state to the facts of the case are so obviously 
limited and minimal that application of that state’s law 
constitutes officious intermeddling.”80 Courts, however, rarely 
disregard the IAD81 and will only do so when a corporation has 
little to no contact with the state of incorporation other than the 
actual act of incorporation.82  
 More importantly, the IAD is a choice of law provision, and 
the doctrine is not applicable in determining forum.83 This means 
                                                                                                     
 76. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) 
(holding the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Act was not preempted and did 
not violate the Commerce Clause). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Havlicek v. Coast-to-Coast Analytical Servs., Inc., 39 Cal. App. 4th 
1844, 1853 (1995) (applying California law to inspection of records of a Delaware 
corporation); Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade, 677 N.W.2d 298, 307 (Wis. 
2004) (applying Wisconsin law to Delaware corporation); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971). 
 79. See Beloit, 677 N.W.2d at 307 (Wis. 2004) (holding Wisconsin law 
applies even to a Delaware corporation due to an absence of contacts between 
the corporation and Delaware and because Wisconsin has not legislatively or 
judicially adopted the internal affairs doctrine). 
 80. Id. at 307. 
 81. See FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4223.50 n.14 
(citing only three cases from two jurisdictions for the proposition that not all 
jurisdictions follow the internal affairs doctrine). 
 82. This was the case in Beloit, for example, in which the court found that 
the corporation had no contacts with Delaware other than the act of 
incorporation and filling bankruptcy. Beloit, 677 N.W.2d at 307. 
 83. See FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4223.50 
(“[T]he internal affairs doctrine is a choice-of-law doctrine and not a bar to 
2084 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2067 (2012) 
that corporations may be required to defend cases in states other 
than the state of incorporation, even though that court will apply 
the law of the state of incorporation. 
The United States Supreme Court has often considered the 
IAD in a forum non conveniens context. An early example is 
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York.84 The Court in Rogers 
upheld the district court’s dismissal of the case, explaining that 
the IAD applied and finding that “considerations of convenience, 
efficiency, and justice” warranted dismissal.85 The Court, 
however, did not mandate dismissal in all cases or establish a 
definitive rule.86 Instead, it analyzed the defendant company’s 
activities in New Jersey to ensure that the company had not 
“organized in that state as a mere matter of convenience for the 
purpose of carrying on all its business in another state.”87 In 
Rogers, the Court stressed the comity due to the state of 
incorporation in a forum non conveniens analysis.88  
In Williams v. Green Bay & Western Railroad Co.,89 the 
Court ruled that IAD jurisprudence informed part of the forum 
non conveniens analysis.90 Reversing the district court’s dismissal 
of the case, the Court ruled “the fact that the corporate law of 
another State is involved does not set the case apart for special 
treatment.”91 Instead, the Court noted that the federal court’s 
application of the law of a state outside its territorial jurisdiction 
was only one factor that could be considered in a forum non 
                                                                                                     
jurisdiction.”). 
 84. See Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of New York, 288 U.S. 123, 133 (1933) 
(holding the district court properly dismissed the case “without prejudice to the 
enforcement of the rights of plaintiff, if any, in the courts of New Jersey”).  
 85. See id. (finding the facts of the case clearly fit within the internal 
affairs of the company and that dismissal was appropriate). 
 86. See id. (“Obviously, no definite rule of general application can be 
formulated by which it may be determined under what circumstances a court 
will assume jurisdiction of stockholders’ suits relating to the conduct of internal 
affairs of foreign corporations.”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Stevelman, supra note 19, at 78–79 (arguing the Court applied a 
conservative approach to comity in Rogers). 
 89. See Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 553 (1946) 
(ruling the doctrine of forum non conveniens was to be used as “an instrument of 
justice” and reversing the case’s dismissal under that doctrine). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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conveniens analysis.92 In applying this case-by-case analysis 
designed “as an ‘instrument of justice,’” the Court stressed the 
ability of the federal court to decide the case and, in this instance, 
provide the requested relief.93 
The Delaware Supreme Court also follows the IAD. In 
McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis,94 the court concluded that application of 
the IAD to transfer of stock from a Panamanian corporation to a 
Delaware subsidiary—and thus application of Panamanian law—
was required by due process, the Commerce Clause, and 
Delaware conflicts principles.95 In so doing, it rejected Norlin 
Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,96 a Second Circuit decision that 
applied New York law to a Panamanian corporation due to 
substantial contacts with New York.97 The Delaware Supreme 
Court emphasized that the IAD involved “those matters which 
are peculiar to the relationships among or between the 
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders”98 
and suggested that the application of the IAD was supported by 
the Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution.99 
                                                                                                     
 92. See id. at 554–57 (stating that forum non conveniens will turn on a 
case-by-case analysis and that there were no special circumstances that should 
have led the district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction). 
 93. See id. at 554, 557 (finding that the policy of fairness and justice behind 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not met in the present case). 
 94. McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531, A.2d 206, 209 (Del. 1987) (holding that 
Panamanian law governs under the internal affairs doctrine and reaffirming 
that doctrine as “a major tenet of Delaware corporation law”). 
 95. Id. at 218. 
 96. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 269 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(affirming the preliminary injunction of a transfer of 49% of stock to an 
Employee Stock Option Plan and Trust and a plan for the board of directors to 
vote those shares in anticipation of a hostile takeover attempt). 
 97. Id. at 261 (holding that New York law expressly applies to the 
Panamanian corporation and prohibiting the hostile takeover defense 
mechanism at issue). 
 98. McDermott, 531 A.2d at 214 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 
(1982)). 
 99. Id. at 218 (finding that the Due Process Clause requires that the 
corporation’s agents “be given adequate notice of the jurisdiction whose laws 
will ultimately govern the corporation’s internal affairs,” and the Commerce 
Clause requires that Delaware law not apply to a Panamanian corporation). 
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While the doctrine may be important later in determining 
the enforceability of a forum selection clause,100 the IAD does not 
determine which court or courts will hear the case, a situation 
that leaves corporations vulnerable to identical actions in 
multiple jurisdictions, even if each court will apply the 
incorporating state’s law. 
E. Forum Non Conveniens 
Another option for a corporation seeking to defend against 
litigation involving its internal affairs in the state of 
incorporation is a motion for change of venue on the basis of 
forum non conveniens.101 A court may not grant a forum non 
conveniens motion if an adequate alternative forum is not 
available.102 The United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Co. v. 
Gilbert103 listed nine factors that are relevant in forum non 
conveniens analysis: (1) the private interest of the litigant; (2) the 
relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the availability of 
compulsory process and cost of attendance for witnesses; (4) 
possibility of view of premises if appropriate, (5) the pendency or 
nonpendency of a similar action in another jurisdiction; (6) the 
ability to exercise jurisdiction over all the individual defendants; 
(7) the relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial; (8) the 
enforceability of the judgment; and (9) any other practical 
                                                                                                     
 100. See infra Part III.C (noting that the IAD might be important because it 
mandates that the court apply the law of the incorporating state in determining 
whether the forum selection clause is enforceable). 
 101. Courts may also grant stays of the action or may transfer the case to 
another jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), but both methods incorporate 
forum non conveniens policy. See, e.g., Goodman v. Fleischmann, 364 F. Supp. 
1172, 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (ruling that when considering a transfer under 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a), a court must confirm that it has jurisdiction over the case, and 
must then use the Gulf Oil Corp. factors to weigh the parties’ interests to 
determine whether the transfer furthers the interest and convenience of the 
parties). 
 102. See Dirienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 294 F.3d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 2002) (“A 
forum non conveniens motion cannot be granted absent an adequate alternative 
forum.”). 
 103. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (holding that the 
district court has inherent power to dismiss a suit pursuant to the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens and properly applied that power in the case), superseded 
by statute, 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1982) (codifying forum non conveniens doctrine). 
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considerations that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and 
inexpensive.104 The Court also noted a public interest in “having 
localized controversies decided at home.”105 In addition, the 
burden is on the defendant making the motion to show that the 
factors strongly weigh in favor of a change of venue,106 and it is 
within the sound discretion of the court in granting or denying a 
forum non conveniens motion, which may only be reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.107 
A forum non conveniens motion will only succeed if there is 
an adequate alternative forum and the court is satisfied that the 
defendant has met its burden in establishing that the balance of 
the factors weigh in favor of finding heavy hardship to defendants 
or the court.108 It would then grant a motion to dismiss, stay, or 
transfer venue.109 Although the governing law in cases involving 
internal affairs of the corporation will be that of the incorporating 
state under the IAD, other factors may not militate towards 
venue in the incorporating state. It is not certain, for example, 
that the proof in the second factor or the individual defendants in 
the fifth factor will be in the incorporating state. To the contrary, 
over 50% of all publicly traded companies are incorporated in 
                                                                                                     
 104. See id. (giving factors to be considered by district court in analysis of 
forum non conveniens motion). 
 105. Id.  
 106. See, e.g., id. (“[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, 
the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”). But see Koster v. 
Am. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (giving less weight to 
plaintiff’s choice of forum in a derivative action in which there may be many 
different potential plaintiffs in many different fora or in which plaintiff has only 
a small financial interest and is acting on behalf of a widely scattered group of 
plaintiffs). 
 107. See Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123, 130–31 (1933) 
(ruling that the district court was “free in the exercise of a sound discretion to 
decline to pass upon the merits of the controversy and to relegate the plaintiff to 
an appropriate forum”). 
 108. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 
422, 430 (2007) (finding that defendant faces a “heavy burden” when advocating 
dismissal under forum non conveniens); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 
235, 249 (1981) (“Under Gilbert, dismissal will ordinarily be appropriate where 
trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or 
the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of 
convenience supporting his choice.”).  
 109. Id. 
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Delaware,110 and these national and worldwide corporations have 
the majority of their data and employees in states other than 
Delaware.111 This does not change the fact, however, that the 
corporation’s internal affairs are governed by the law of the 
incorporating state, and that each state’s courts are best able to 
interpret its own state law. 
Turning specifically to Delaware state law, the Delaware 
Supreme Court has established two doctrines to aid Delaware 
courts in ruling on forum non conveniens and stay motions.112 In 
McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Engineering 
Co.,113 the court ruled that Delaware courts will not grant a stay 
“as a matter of right by reason of a prior action pending in 
another jurisdiction involving the same parties and the same 
issues.”114 The court, however, supported a general rule that 
“litigation should be confined to the forum in which it is first 
commenced” and that the courts should be wary of defendants 
seeking to defeat plaintiff’s choice of forum by “commencing 
litigation involving the same cause of action in another 
jurisdiction of its own choosing.”115 The court noted that the 
                                                                                                     
 110. Delaware Division of Corporations, Why Choose Delaware as Your 
Corporate Home?, http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 111. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or 
Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 
YALE L.J. 553, 578 (2002) (finding that 85% of corporations choosing to 
incorporate out of their headquarters state choose to incorporate outside of 
Delaware); Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1559, 1570–74 (2002) (“[N]o state besides Delaware has had any 
meaningful success in attracting out-of-state firms going public.”). 
 112. The Delaware Supreme Court has found no difference between a 
motion on grounds of forum non conveniens and a motion to stay. See Gen. 
Foods Corp. v. Cryo-Maid, Inc., 198 A.2d 681, 683 (Del. 1964) (“In principle we 
can see no difference between a stay based upon similar grounds and an actual 
dismissal of the action itself.”), overruled on other grounds by Pepsico, Inc. v. 
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Asbury Park, 261 A.2d 520 (Del. 1969). 
 113. McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng’g Co., 263 
A.2d 281, 283 (Del. 1970) (holding that the superior court abused its discretion 
in refusing to stay or dismiss the action pending in Delaware in light of an 
Alabama action between the same parties and involving the same issues). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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policy underpinnings of comity and “the necessities of an orderly 
and efficient administration of justice” support this view.116 
If there is no action pending in another jurisdiction, 
Delaware courts apply General Foods Corp. v. Cryo-Maid, Inc.,117 
which is a much tougher standard than McWane.118 Under Cryo-
Maid, the moving party must prove “overwhelming hardship”119 
through any or all of the Cryo-Maid factors: “(1) the relative ease 
of access to proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process for 
witnesses; (3) the possibility of the view of the premises, if 
appropriate; (4) all other practical problems that would make the 
trial of the case easy, expeditious and inexpensive;” and 
(5) “whether or not the controversy is dependent upon the 
application of Delaware law which the courts of this state more 
properly should decide than those of another jurisdiction.”120 
The IAD and forum non conveniens motions mandate the use 
of the incorporating state’s law and in some cases dismissal or 
stay of an action in another jurisdiction in favor of those of the 
incorporating state. While these are both positive developments, 
a defendant corporation may face actions in two courts, and must 
attempt to convince one or the other to grant a forum non 
conveniens motion to stay or dismiss.121 Even if one court is 
willing to dismiss or stay the case, the corporation must litigate a 
forum non conveniens motion and pay the associated expenses. 
Frequently, however, both courts are unwilling to dismiss or stay 
                                                                                                     
 116. Id. 
 117. See Cryo-Maid, 198 A.2d at 684 (affirming the vice chancellor’s stay of 
Delaware action in favor of later-filed Illinois action when factors established 
favor the later action). 
 118. See R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 13.5 (3rd ed. 2010) (noting that 
Cyro-Maid is a tougher standard to meet than McWane because defendants 
must prove “overwhelming hardship”). 
 119. Gen. Foods Corp. v. Cryo-Maid, Inc., 198 A.2d 681, 684 (Del. 1964), 
overruled on other grounds by Pepsico, Inc. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Asbury 
Park, 261 A.2d 520 (Del. 1969). 
 120. Id. 
 121. The corporation may be forced to defend the same action in even more 
than two courts. In M&A transactions, for example, there are an average of four 
actions for each transaction, with one transaction resulting in forty-one separate 
suits. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces 
of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1769 (2004). 
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in favor of the other.122 In this case, the corporation faces the 
unenviable position of defending the same litigation twice or 
more. The use of a forum selection clause in a corporation’s 
governing document—if effective—would put an end to this 
unnecessary litigation. As the United States Supreme Court 
noted in another context: “[A] clause establishing ex ante the 
forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of dispelling 
any confusion about where suits . . . must be brought and 
defended.”123 
III. Use of Forum Selection Clauses in Governing Documents 
A. Policy Supporting Forum Selection Clauses 
The reasons why forum selection clauses are needed have 
been summarized by former Chancellor Chandler as “the multi-
forum deal litigation” problem.124 He observed: 
[T]he fallout of [multi-forum deal litigation] has become 
increasingly problematic in recent years as more and more of 
these cases are filed in multiple jurisdictions. Judges, defense 
counsel, and the plaintiffs’ bar are now routinely confronted 
with these sorts of disputes and have yet to come up with a 
workable solution. The potential problems, as one can imagine, 
are numerous. Defense counsel is forced to litigate the same 
case—often identical claims—in multiple courts. Judicial 
resources are wasted as judges in two or more jurisdictions 
review the same documents and at times are asked to decide 
the exact same motions. Worse still, if a case does not settle or 
consolidate in one forum, there is the possibility that two 
judges would apply the law differently or otherwise reach 
different outcomes, which would then leave the law in a 
confused state and pose full faith and credit problems for all 
involved. . . . The problems do not end there. In the event that 
                                                                                                     
 122. Compare, e.g., In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 954 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (denying motion to stay or dismiss because Delaware had a 
particularly strong interest in addressing new issues in its own law), with In re 
Topps Co., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 600715/07, 2007 WL 5018882, at *3 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. June 8, 2007) (denying motion to stay or dismiss because the New York 
action was the first filed). 
 123. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991). 
 124. In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 
1135016, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011). 
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defense counsel settles in Delaware over another jurisdiction, 
leaving one set of plaintiffs’ counsel out in the cold, the 
unfavored forum’s plaintiffs’ lawyers then often flock to 
Delaware to oppose the settlement (and vice versa). And there 
are the post-settlement or post litigation issues as well: class 
certification, approval of attorneys’ fees, and then dividing 
those attorneys’ fees between the various plaintiffs’ counsel.125 
Chancellor Chandler identifies three main concerns: the litigation 
cost of defending the same case in multiple jurisdictions, the 
judicial resources wasted in redundant decisions on the same 
issue, and the possibility of conflicting decisions on the same 
issue.126 These concerns apply to all litigation against a 
corporation, but with different rationales depending on whether 
the claim is made directly against the company or by derivative 
action on behalf of the company.  
These concerns are at their strongest in M&A litigation, 
which tends to be highly duplicative. In Cornerstone Research’s 
study on security class action filings, thirty-eight of the forty 
M&A actions brought in federal court were also brought in state 
court.127 The other two actions related to foreign companies.128 
One attorney estimates that 50% of all M&A transactions—not 
just the transactions that result in litigation—generate 
duplicative litigation.129 In typical M&A litigation, the 
shareholder bringing the action will usually allege an unfair 
transaction price or claim that the directors gave shareholders 
inadequate or misleading information about the proposed 
transaction.130 In other words, the shareholder is bringing a claim 
on behalf of the corporation as its agent or representative against 
the directors who proposed the transaction. Because the 
corporation is required to indemnify these directors if they are 
successful in defending themselves and are likely to indemnify 
                                                                                                     
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2010 YEAR 
IN REVIEW 33 (2011), available at www.cornerstone.com/securities-filings-2010-
year-in-review.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Savitt, supra note 5. 
 130. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 127, at 33 (describing the 
typical M&A litigation).  
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them even if they are not,131 a corporation would never file 
duplicative litigation when it will likely bear the costs of 
defending multiple cases on the same issue. While a single 
fiduciary duty action may increase the transaction’s value to the 
company by requiring the board to prove the price was the best 
that it could obtain and that it fairly disclosed the advantages 
and risks of the transaction to the company, additional actions in 
other jurisdictions add no marginal value and even present 
possible holdout problems.132 
While M&A litigation is the largest trouble spot for 
duplicative litigation, a corporation will usually be required to 
indemnify its directors for other duplicative derivative litigation. 
The corporation will indemnify the successful director for 
reasonable expenses as long as the action was “by reason of the 
fact” that the person was a director, which would include 
                                                                                                     
 131. Directors and officers who are successful in defending themselves 
against derivative actions are usually entitled to indemnification as a matter of 
right in most jurisdictions. See 3 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 259 (3d ed. 2010). Even if the director or officer is 
not successful in defending herself, she will be indemnified for her expenses (but 
not any fines, judgments, or settlements) if a court or a committee of 
independent directors determines that the director’s or officer’s conduct met the 
standards set forth in the indemnification statute. See id. at 262–63 (citing 
MBCA § 8.51(a) (2008) and DGCL tit. 8 § 145(a) (2001)). Therefore, if 
shareholders initiate suits in multiple jurisdictions and the director or officer is 
successful in defending, the corporation is liable for the additional expense. 
Even if the shareholder is successful, the corporation is likely to pay the 
expenses in order to attract skilled directors and officers. The typical 
corporation will also provide director and officer (D&O) insurance. This 
insurance consists of two parts: coverage to reimburse the corporation for its 
costs in indemnifying its directors and officers and coverage that extends 
directly to the individual officer or director for whom indemnification from the 
corporation is not available or immediately forthcoming. 
 132. For example, if a corporation faces two actions regarding a proposed 
merger and plaintiff A settles with the corporation, plaintiff B may seek a larger 
settlement than A because B is the only thing standing between the corporation 
and the merger. The corporation is likely to acquiesce. As Jim Pittinger noted: 
“Defendants have been settling too many of these suits in order to not hold up 
the underlying transaction. It’s easy to lose a payoff in the hundreds of 
thousands, or even low millions, of dollars for plaintiffs’ attorneys ‘fees’ when 
you have a deal in the billions or tens-of-billions with fees already in the 
multimillions for assorted lawyers, underwriters, etc.” CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
supra note 127, at 33. The absurdity of this reality is apparent when it is noted 
that an additional action adds no marginal value to the company, even if 
successful. 
THE POWER OF A SUGGESTION 2093 
fiduciary-duty claims.133 The unsuccessful director would be 
entitled to indemnification against a fiduciary duty claim if the 
court finds the defendant is “fairly and reasonably entitled to 
indemnification.”134 Therefore, whether the action is successful or 
not, the corporation is likely to be required to indemnify its 
directors and officers for their expenses in defending against 
litigation brought “by reason of the fact” that the defendant was a 
director or officer.135 Again, the corporation would never bring 
suit against a director or officer in multiple jurisdictions because 
it would, if unsuccessful, likely be forced to pay the defense’s 
expenses twice. It is illogical to allow a shareholder to bring the 
same claim on the corporation’s behalf in multiple jurisdictions. 
In contrast to derivative litigation, a shareholder pursuing a 
direct action against the company or its directors or officers acts 
on her own behalf, and the understanding that the shareholder is 
acting as a representative of the corporation does not apply. 
There are reasons, however, why shareholders bringing direct 
litigation should be bound by a forum selection clause. When the 
shareholder bought the stock he either had notice of the forum 
selection clause if it had been adopted or notice that the board of 
directors had the authority to adopt such a provision. Indeed, the 
board of directors can only adopt a bylaw including a forum 
selection clause if the charter gives them this power.136 All 
portions of the charter must be approved by the shareholders, 
either at the founding of the corporation or in an amendment.137 
Thus, the shareholder should be bound by either the prior vote to 
give the board authority to amend the bylaws—and his decision 
to buy stock in that company with knowledge of the board’s 
authority to do so—or by the vote of the shareholders to include a 
forum selection provision in the charter.138 
                                                                                                     
 133. COX & HAZEN, supra note 131, at 257–58, 262. 
 134. Id. at 264. 
 135. Id. at 257–58. 
 136. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its 
certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws 
upon the directors . . . .”). 
 137. See id. §§ 102, 242 (defining adoption and amendment of the certificate 
of incorporation). 
 138. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del. 
2008) (“Bylaws, by their very nature, set down rules and procedures that bind a 
corporation’s board and its shareholders.”); 10 C.J.S. Corporations § 165 (2012) 
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A shareholder plaintiff may also argue that he should be 
entitled to file his claim in any court with jurisdiction because he 
would, in effect, lose his day in court due to his inability to travel 
to the selected forum. A California plaintiff, for example, may 
argue that, if the court enforces a Delaware forum selection 
clause, he will be unable to litigate his case in Delaware because 
of an inability to travel to Delaware because of health or travel 
expenses. Putting aside the ease of interstate travel, the practical 
realities of corporate litigation ensure that the plaintiff will not 
be materially hindered in bringing his case.139 Unlike, for 
example, a tort claim, a shareholder’s claim is not likely to 
require testimony from eyewitnesses or the plaintiff himself, but 
will instead involve facts gleaned from discovery and testimony 
from experts, all of which are equally available in the state of 
incorporation as in the plaintiff’s selected forum. 
B. Legal History of Forum Selection Clauses 
1. Federal Courts 
Cases on forum selection clauses in any area of law are 
sparse. The United States Supreme Court has decided two forum 
selection cases in admiralty law,140 while the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s headline case on forum selection clauses was decided in 
the limited liability company (LLC) context, and that decision 
was likely driven by policy considerations unique to that business 
arrangement.141  
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in M/S Bremen 
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.142 signaled a shift in the federal courts’ 
                                                                                                     
(“Bylaws ordinarily are binding on the stockholders or members whether they 
expressly consent to them or not.”). 
 139. Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) 
(finding that Florida is not “a remote alien forum” for Washington plaintiffs). 
 140. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16 (1972); Carnival 
Cruise, 499 U.S. at 595. 
 141. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 296 (Del. 1999) 
(using broad language on mandatory forum selection provisions in deciding the 
application of a forum selection provision in the LLC context). 
 142. M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 16 (holding that forum selection clauses are 
valid in international admiralty contracts unless the opposing party can show 
that enforcement would be unreasonable, unjust, or invalid for fraud or 
THE POWER OF A SUGGESTION 2095 
view on forum selection clauses from disfavor on public policy 
grounds to acceptance and acknowledgement that such clauses 
were to be enforced unless some reason other than the mere 
existence of the clause was found.143 The Court ruled that forum 
selection clauses are prima facie valid and would be enforced 
unless the resisting party “could clearly show that enforcement 
would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid 
for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”144  
Because there was no allegation of fraud or overreaching, the 
Court only considered whether the clause was unreasonable or 
unjust.145 It noted that some courts have found that a forum 
selection clause may be unreasonable if it “is seriously 
inconvenient for the trial of action.”146 The Court noted, however, 
that the defendant who was attempting to escape the clause was 
party to a freely negotiated contract that bound it to the London 
forum as specified in the contract, and questioned how the 
defendant could prove unreasonableness when it agreed in a 
freely negotiated contract to what it was opposing in court.147  
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,148 the Court applied 
the M/S Bremen analysis to form contracts that had not been 
negotiated.149 In Carnival Cruise, the company sent tickets that 
                                                                                                     
overreaching). 
 143. See id. at 12 (finding that the old “provincial attitude” against enforcing 
forum selection clauses is outdated and ruling that they should be upheld as a 
useful and sometimes necessary addition to business contracts). 
 144. Id. at 15. 
 145. See id. (“The correct approach would have been to enforce the forum 
clause specifically unless Zapata could clearly show that enforcement would be 
unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as 
fraud or overreaching.”). 
 146. Id. at 16. 
 147. See id. (“Of course, where it can be said with reasonable assurance that 
at the time they entered the contract, the parties to a freely negotiated private 
international commercial agreement contemplated the claimed inconvenience, it 
is difficult to see why any such claim of inconvenience should be heard to render 
the forum clause unenforceable.”). 
 148. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (holding 
forum selection clause incorporated into ticket contract enforceable despite lack 
of bargaining and alleged inconvenience to the ticketholders). 
 149. See id. at 593 (noting that “common sense dictates that a ticket of this 
kind would be a form contract the terms of which are not subject to 
negotiation”). 
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incorporated by reference an attached notice that all litigation 
regarding disputes between the passengers and the cruise liner 
must be brought in the Florida courts.150 While recognizing that, 
unlike in M/S Bremen, the parties in this case had unequal 
bargaining power, the Court rejected this distinction as a dividing 
line for enforcement of forum selection clauses.151 The Court 
instead emphasized that forum selection clauses in form 
contracts should be scrutinized by the judiciary for fundamental 
fairness.152 The Court equated fundamental fairness with the lack 
of bad-faith motives, and cited such factors as Carnival’s 
principal place of business and that many of its cruises depart 
from and return to Florida ports as evidence of good faith.153 
The single case that squarely addresses forum selection 
clauses in a corporation’s governing documents is Galaviz v. 
Berg,154 a California case involving Oracle, one of the first 
corporations to utilize a forum selection clause.155 The Galaviz 
court applied federal common law, which requires a mutual 
agreement between the parties, even if the contract was one of 
adhesion, as in Carnival Cruise.156 In the case at hand, the court 
highlighted the unilateral amendment of the bylaws by the 
directors after most of the alleged wrongdoing had occurred.157 
                                                                                                     
 150. See id. at 588 (quoting contract language). 
 151. See id. at 593 (“[W]e do not adopt the Court of Appeals’ determination 
that a nonnegotiated forum-selection clause in a form ticket contract is never 
enforceable simply because it is not the subject of bargaining.”). 
 152. Id. at 595.  
 153. See id. (finding that Carnival has its principal place of business in 
Florida and many of its cruises depart from and return to Florida ports as 
evidence of good faith in including a forum selection clause in the ticket 
contract). 
 154. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying 
motion to dismiss based on forum selection clause specifying Delaware’s Court 
of Chancery as sole forum). 
 155. Oracle adopted a bylaw forum selection clause in 2006. See Allen 2011, 
supra note 65, at 24.  
 156. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) 
(rejecting the court of appeals’ holding that “a nonnegotiated forum-selection 
clause in a form ticket contract is never enforceable simply because it is not the 
subject of bargaining”); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 
(1972) (finding “a freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected 
by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power”). 
 157. Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 n.4 (noting that Oracle would not have 
been able to accomplish a unilateral amendment of the bylaws under contract 
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“[W]here, as here, the bylaw was adopted by the very individuals 
who are named as defendants, and after the alleged wrongdoing 
took place, there is no element of mutual consent to the forum 
choice at all, at least with respect to shareholders who purchased 
their shares prior to the time the bylaw was adopted.”158 It 
distinguished Carnival Cruise and its Ninth Circuit progeny, 
Argueta v. Banco Mexicano S.A.,159 by characterizing these cases 
as “merely giving effect to the bilateral agreement between the 
parties”160 in the case, while it emphasized that the Oracle forum 
selection clause had not been agreed to or ratified by the 
shareholders.161  
The Galaviz court, however, was willing to enforce forum 
selection clauses when these clauses qualified as bilateral 
contracts.162 It noted that if the clause fell under the Carnival 
Cruise and Argueta analysis, “there would be little basis to 
                                                                                                     
law).  
 158. Id. at 1171. 
 159. Argueta v. Banco Mexicano S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 327 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(upholding forum selection clause). The Argueta court distilled three factors 
from Carnival Cruise and M/S Bremen that would destroy the enforceability of 
a contractual forum selection clause:  
(1) [I]ts incorporation into the contract was the result of fraud, undue 
influence, or overweening bargaining power; (2) the selected forum is 
so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the complaining party will 
for all practical purposes be deprived of its day in court; or 
(3) enforcement of the clause would contravene a strong public policy 
of the forum in which the suit is brought.  
Id. at 325. 
 160. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011). The court 
failed to take into account, however, the fact that shareholders authorized the 
board of directors to pass bylaws. If a forum selection clause in a contract of 
adhesion, such as that in Carnival Cruise, is permissible, it seems unreasonable 
to refuse to enforce such a clause in a bylaw that is authorized by the 
shareholders. 
 161. Id. at 1172. The Galaviz court found what it characterized as suspicious 
facts and, if it had not struck down the clause on a contract theory, may well 
have found that the facts meet the “fraud, undue influence, or overweening 
bargaining power” requirement of Argueta, 87 F.3d at 327. See Galaviz, 763 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1172 (finding that the board of directors passed the forum selection 
clause after the vast majority of alleged fraudulent overcharges had occurred). 
 162. See Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (“Were the Argueta factors 
controlling here [because of a bilateral contract], there would be little basis for 
declining to enforce the venue provision of Oracle’s bylaws.”). 
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decline to enforce the venue provision.”163 The court found more 
persuasive value in a charter amendment—that requires the 
approval of a majority of shareholders—than a bylaw approved 
solely by the board of directors.164 
2. Delaware Courts 
Like the federal courts, the Delaware Supreme Court has 
dealt with forum selection clauses, but not in a corporation’s 
governing documents. The main case decided by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in this field is Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. 
Jaffari,165 in which the court upheld a forum selection clause in a 
LLC agreement and found that the clause operated to strip 
jurisdiction from Delaware courts in favor of arbitration in 
California.166 While the court’s decision in Elf Atochem was 
largely based on the Delaware LLC Act and its emphasis on 
freedom of contract between the parties to the LLC agreement,167 
the discussion in Elf Atochem on the Court of Chancery’s 
jurisdiction is relevant to a discussion of forum selection clauses 
in the corporation context. 
In discussing the Delaware LLC Act’s vestment of 
jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery, the Delaware Supreme 
Court listed three purposes that this action achieved. The most 
                                                                                                     
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at 1175 (“Certainly were a majority of shareholders to approve 
such a charter amendment, the arguments for treating the venue provision like 
those in commercial contracts would be much stronger, even in the case of a 
plaintiff shareholder who had personally voted against the amendment.”). For 
in-depth discussion of this point, see infra Part III.E.3 (discussing the difference 
between charter and bylaw clauses). 
 165. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291, 295 (Del. 1999) 
(holding that a forum selection clause mandating arbitration in California was 
enforceable due to the strong policies supporting “maximum effect to the 
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of LLC agreements” 
and “in favor of arbitration”). 
 166. Id. at 287. 
 167. See id. at 291 (discussing the emphasis given to parties’ freedom to 
contract in LLC agreements and holding that parties may contract to avoid 
Delaware jurisdiction). The Court of Chancery followed Elf Atochem in a 
factually similar case. See Douzinas v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, Inc., 888 A.2d 
1146, 1149 (Del. Ch. 2006) (applying choice of law provision to require 
arbitration in Texas).  
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important of these for purposes of this Note is the third, which 
reads: “[Vesting of jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery] tends to 
center interpretive litigation in Delaware courts with the 
expectation of uniformity.”168 This observation illustrates the 
concern Delaware courts have about the interpretation of 
Delaware law by other courts, and would hold true in the 
corporate context as well. 
Recent case law demonstrates that forum selection clauses 
would likely be upheld in corporations as well as LLCs. In Baker 
v. Impact Holding, Inc.,169 Vice Chancellor Parsons noted that 
Delaware’s legislature had enacted legislation in response to Elf 
Atochem, effectively banning forum selection clauses that would 
bind nonmanager members and limited partners in the LLC and 
limited partnership contexts, respectively.170 Vice Chancellor 
Parsons, however, also noted that the legislature did not amend 
the General Corporation Law in a similar way171 and upheld the 
forum selection clause against a former director of the 
corporation.172 In addition, as has already been discussed, Vice 
Chancellor Laster in Revlon agreed with Vice Chancellor Parsons 
in supporting the policy behind forum selection clauses.173 
                                                                                                     
 168. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 292. The court also listed as policy reasons 
favoring this forum selection: 
1) it assured that the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction it might not 
otherwise have because it is a court of limited jurisdiction that 
requires traditional equitable relief or specific legislation to act[, and] 
(2) it established the Court of Chancery as the default forum in the 
event the members did not provide another choice of forum or dispute 
resolution mechanism. 
Id.  
 169. Baker v. Impact Holding, Inc., No. 4960-VCP, 2010 WL 1931032, at *1 
(Del. Ch. May 13, 2010) (holding forum selection clause mandating forum in 
Texas applicable and enforceable to director of corporation and dismissing case 
without prejudice). 
 170. Id. at *2 (citing amended versions of Delaware LLC Act §§ 17-109(d) 
and 18-109(d)). The legislature likely amended these sections to keep Delaware 
LLCs and LPs from selecting another state as the exclusive jurisdiction. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at *15. 
 173. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960–61 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (acknowledging that one possible effect of greater judicial oversight of 
“frequent filers” is that they may file elsewhere, but supporting use of forum 
selection clause if board of directors and shareholders believe appropriate). 
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The Delaware Supreme Court has also ruled on forum 
selection clauses in contracts. In Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc.,174 the 
court adopted the presumption of validity instituted by M/S 
Bremen and Carnival Cruise. In Ingres, the court defined the 
relationship between the McWane forum non conveniens doctrine 
and forum selection clauses. The court held that “where 
contracting parties have a legally enforceable forum selection 
clause, a court should honor the parties’ contract and enforce the 
clause, even if, absent any forum selection clause, the McWane 
principle might otherwise require a different result.”175 The court 
also incorporated M/S Bremen’s presumption of validity and 
found that forum selection clauses would be enforced unless the 
opposing party “clearly show[s] that enforcement would be 
unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause [is] invalid for such 
reasons as fraud and overreaching.”176  
In summary, while Delaware courts have only tangentially 
touched on forum selection clauses in corporate governing 
documents177—and the Delaware Supreme Court has yet to 
address them at all—Delaware courts seem sympathetic to 
corporations utilizing these clauses to defend litigation in the 
state of incorporation and willing to enforce them. 
C. Enforcement of Forum Selection Clauses 
The arguments on the enforceability of forum selection 
clauses will vary depending on whether the court is a federal 
court sitting in diversity or a state court. In ruling on a forum 
selection clause, a federal court sitting in diversity can take two 
                                                                                                     
 174. Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1145 (Del. 2010) (holding that 
forum selection clauses trump the McWane principle). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id.  
 177. Several new cases have recently been filed against nine corporations 
with bylaw forum selection clauses in the Court of Chancery. See Francis G.X. 
Pileggi, Multiple New Suits Challenge Exclusive Forum Selection Bylaws in 
Delaware Court of Chancery (Feb. 8, 2012, 11:42 PM), http://www.lexisnexis. 
com/community/corpsec/blogs/corporate-law-blog/archive/2012 /02/08/multiple-new-
suits-challenge-exclusive-forum-selection-bylaws-in-delaware-court-of-chancery.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
These cases will help to provide precedent on this issue in Delaware. 
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approaches. First, it can analyze the clause under federal 
common law as articulated in M/S Bremen and Carnival Cruise 
and followed by Galaviz.178 Galaviz declined to follow Delaware 
corporate law and held that federal common law applied to forum 
selection clauses because they are procedural in nature and thus 
governed by federal law.179 In coming to this conclusion, Galaviz 
followed Manetti–Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci American, Inc.,180 a Ninth 
Circuit case, which held that, under an Erie–Hanna analysis,181 
the federal interest in upholding the federal venue rules 
outweighed the state interest.182 The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have also held that federal law governs forum 
selection.183 
If a federal court does find that federal common law controls, 
a corporation defending a bylaw or charter forum selection clause 
can argue these cases are a close analogy to the forum selection 
clause in Carnival Cruise. In that case, the Court noted:  
First, a cruise line has a special interest in limiting the fora in 
which it potentially could be subject to suit. Because a cruise 
ship typically carries passengers from many locales, it is not 
unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could subject the cruise line 
to litigation in several different fora. Additionally, a clause 
                                                                                                     
 178. See Latham & Watkins, LLP, Corporate Governance Update: New 
Challenges and Strategies for Designating Delaware as the Exclusive 
Jurisdiction for Intra-Corporate Disputes (May 2011), www.lw.com (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2012) (noting that Galaviz applied federal common law rather than 
Delaware corporate law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 179. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (ruling 
that “the enforceability of a proported venue requirement is a matter of federal 
common law”).  
 180. Manetti–Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512–13 (9th Cir. 
1988) (holding that forum selection clause in exclusive dealership contract 
governed dealer’s tort and contract claims). 
 181. Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), courts presiding over a diversity case must decide 
whether the issue is substantive or procedural in nature. Generally, if the issue 
is procedural, federal law applies. If the issue is substantive, state law applies. 
See A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 360 
(2d ed. 2008). 
 182. Manetti–Farrow, 858 F.2d at 512–13. 
 183. See Int’l Software Sys., Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 115 (5th Cir. 
1996); Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990); Stewart Org., Inc. v. 
Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067–68 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (en banc), 
aff’d on other grounds, 487 U.S. 22 (1988).  
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establishing ex ante the forum for dispute resolution has the 
salutary effect of dispelling any confusion about where suits 
arising from the contract must be brought and defended, 
sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial motions to 
determine the correct forum and conserving judicial resources 
that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those motions. 
Finally, it stands to reason that passengers who purchase 
tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in this case 
benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that 
the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be 
sued.184 
Each of these three policy reasons cited by the Court would be 
satisfied by a typical forum selection clause in a corporation’s 
governing documents. First, a corporation, like a cruise line, has 
a special interest in limiting the fora in which it is potentially 
subject to suit because corporations typically operate in many 
different states and a single action or transaction has effects 
spread over many states. Second, because the forum is already 
specified, both the plaintiffs and the corporation can save 
litigation expenses and the states can conserve judicial resources. 
While less obvious, the corporation’s shareholders will benefit 
under the forum selection clause because the corporation will not 
be indemnifying or advancing litigation costs to defending 
directors or officers in multiple jurisdictions.185  
Corporations defending a bylaw forum selection clause under 
federal common law face an uphill battle in proving a bilateral 
agreement similar to that which was found in M/S Bremen and 
Carnival Cruise, especially in bylaw forum selection clauses that 
are passed by the board of directors. Corporations should stress, 
however, that shareholders must give the board of directors 
authorization to pass bylaws,186 and this authorization arguably 
                                                                                                     
 184.  Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991) 
(citations omitted).  
 185. See supra Part II.A (describing the additional, needless costs incurred 
by the corporation in indemnifying directors or officers for defending against the 
same claim in multiple jurisdictions). 
 186. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 109(a) (2011) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its 
certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws 
upon the directors.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b) (2011) (“A corporation’s 
board of directors may amend or repeal the corporation’s bylaws, unless . . . the 
shareholders in amending, repealing, or adopting a bylaw expressly provide that 
the board of directors may not amend, repeal, or reinstate that bylaw.”). 
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equates to the shareholders’ half of a bilateral agreement that was 
required in Galaviz.187 Uncertainty at this point, however, renders 
this mutual agreement requirement under federal common law the 
most persuasive argument in favor of charter, as opposed to bylaw, 
forum selection clauses.188 
If a defending corporation decides to take a corporate, rather 
than contractual, approach, Manetti-Farrow and the cases following 
it have focused on the traditional forum selection clause in a 
contract,189 and can be distinguished in the bylaw or charter forum 
selection clause context. In these cases, a corporation can point to 
the state’s interest in enforcement of its substantive law governing 
the relationship between the shareholders, directors, officers, and 
the corporation itself. A corporation in this position should argue 
that the balance is shifted in the state’s favor and that state’s law 
should control. This argument is bolstered by the fact that the 
Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have all held that state law 
governs forum selection.190 
If a federal court follows state law, it would apply the law of the 
state of incorporation due to the IAD.191 For Delaware corporations, 
this would mean Delaware corporate law. As discussed previously, it 
                                                                                                     
 187. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(finding that the bylaw forum selection clause was a unilateral amendment to 
the “contract” between the corporation and shareholders and declining to 
enforce it). 
 188. See infra Part III.E.3 (comparing the advantages and shortcomings of 
charter and bylaw forum selection clauses). 
 189.  See, e.g., Manetti–Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 511 
(9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the issue in the case was contracts that included 
identical forum selection clauses, which provided: “For any controversy 
regarding interpretation or fulfillment of the present contract, the Court of 
Florence has sole jurisdiction”). 
 190.  See Nutter v. New Rents, Inc., No. 90-2493, 1991 WL 193490, at *6 
(4th Cir. Oct. 1, 1991); Farmland Indus., Inc v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, 
Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1986) (choosing to apply state law to forum 
selection clauses); Gen. Eng’g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 
352, 356–57 (3d Cir. 1986). But see Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping 
Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1068–69 (8th Cir. 1986) (concluding in dicta that forum 
selection clauses involve venue issues and are therefore procedural clauses 
governed by federal law). Farmland Industries was decided after Sun World 
Lines and specifically distinguished Sun World Lines as an admiralty case. 
Farmland Industries, 806 F.2d at 852. 
 191. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) 
(“No principle of corporate law and practice is more firmly established than a 
State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations.”). 
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seems likely that Delaware law would enforce charter or bylaw 
forum selection clauses, although the case law admittedly remains 
undeveloped.192 
If a corporation seeks to enforce a forum selection clause in 
state court, the decision is simpler. Under the IAD, the court must 
apply the law of the state of incorporation, which for a Delaware 
corporation would be Delaware. If a court finds that Delaware law 
requires dismissal, it will only decline to enforce a forum selection 
clause if it finds that the state in which the court sits requires that 
result as a matter of public policy.  
A potential example of this scenario might occur under § 2115 
of the California Corporations Code, which provides that a 
corporation, the securities of which are not traded on a national 
exchange, which transacts more than half of its business in 
California, and which has more than half of its voting stock held by 
California residents, is subject to California corporate law.193 
Because California courts have applied § 2115 to corporations 
incorporated outside of California as long as they have sufficient 
contacts with the state,194 it is possible, even likely, that a 
California court may refuse to stay or dismiss the action because it 
believes that California has the largest stake in protecting resident 
shareholders and employees and that this interest trumps 
Delaware’s interest in regulating the internal affairs of its 
corporation.195 However, if California courts take this approach, it 
                                                                                                     
 192. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing Delaware case law on forum selection 
clauses). 
 193. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (2012); see also Sara Lewis, Transforming 
the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but Chancery” Solution, 
14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199, 201 (2008) (describing and discussing CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 2115). 
 194. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 56, 68–69 (recognizing the validity of the internal affairs doctrine, but 
applying § 2115 to the corporation because of sufficient contacts with 
California). 
 195. Id. at 217. Proponents of Section 2115 would point to RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971), which provides that any state 
may apply its own law in “the unusual case” in which it has a more significant 
relationship to the occurrence and to the parties than the incorporating state. 
These proponents would argue that this is exactly what California’s law 
accomplishes. The problem with this argument is that use of this exception is 
extremely rare. See FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 4223.50 n.14 (citing only two cases that utilized this exception). 
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arguably conflicts with Supreme Court precedent and may result 
in a certiorari grant by the Supreme Court.196 
D. Previous Use of Forum Selection Clauses by Corporations 
The history of the forum selection clause really begins with 
Revlon. For the 195 Delaware corporations that have currently 
adopted or are in the process of adopting choice of forum 
provisions, 189 (96.9% of all forum selection clauses either adopted 
or in the process of being adopted) adopted the provision after 
Revlon.197 By any standard, Revlon has had a substantial effect on 
corporations and corporate attorneys and heightens the need for 
clarity in this area.  
Of the 192 Delaware corporations, 103 adopted forum 
selection clauses in connection with an initial public offering, 
making this by far the single most common scenario.198 Another 
forty-six clauses (23.6%) were adopted concurrently with other 
bylaw amendments, usually as part of annual bylaw reviews.199 
Sixteen (8.2%) were adopted by board of directors on a stand-alone 
basis.200 Five (2.6%) adopted forum selection clauses while 
emerging from bankruptcy protection.201 Ten (5.1%) took 
advantage of forum selection clauses when reincorporating in 
Delaware.202 
According to Joseph Grundfest, forum selection clauses have 
evolved in clusters, each based on an initial wording that was copied 
by “descendants” in that group.203 Grundfest has termed the first 
attempt at forum selection clauses the Gibson Dunn cluster.204  
                                                                                                     
 196. See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89 (“No principle of corporate law and 
practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic 
corporations.”); Grundfest, supra note 62, at 23. 
 197. Allen, supra note 3, at 4. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See Grundfest, supra note 62, at 3 (noting that forum selection clauses 
tended to occur in clusters). 
 204. Id. at 4. 




Any action brought by any stockholder against the Corporation or against 
any officer, director, employee, agent or advisor of the Corporation, including 
without limitation any such action brought on behalf of the Corporation, 
shall be brought solely in a court of competent jurisdiction located in the 
State of Delaware. 
This cluster included Standard Pacific, Inc. in 1991, CKE 
Restaurants, Inc. in 1994,205 and Kennedy-Wilson, Inc. in 2009.206 
Identical in wording, these early attempts at forum selection limited 
jurisdiction over shareholder suits against “any officer, director, 
employee, agent or advisor of the company” to “a court of competent 
jurisdiction located in the State of Delaware.”207  
Lasting development in forum selection clauses built upon 
clauses adopted by Oracle, Inc. in 2006, Netlist, Inc. in 2006, 




The sole and exclusive forum for any actual or purported derivative action 




The Delaware Chancery Court shall be the sole forum and venue for any lawsuit 
or legal proceeding by the corporation against any of its directors or officers 
within the jurisdiction of that court. The state or federal courts located in the 
State of Delaware shall be the sole forum and venue for any lawsuit or legal 
proceeding by the corporation against any of its directors or officers not within 
the jurisdiction of the Delaware Chancery Court. 
Netsuite, 
Inc. 
Delaware shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or 
proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim 
of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer or other employee of the 
Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action 
asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL, (iv) or any 
action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine. 
                                                                                                     
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. (grouping Standard Pacific and CKE Restaurants); Allen 2011, 
supra note 65, at 7 n.42 (noting that Standard Pacific, CKE Restaurants, and 
Kennedy-Wilson Holdings have identical forum selection clauses).  
 207. See Kennedy-Wilson Holdings, Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, § 8.5) (Sept. 24, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1408100/000104746 
909008529/a2194546zex-3_11.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 208. Grundfest, supra note 62, at 4. 




Unless the corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative 
forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and 
exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of 
the corporation, (ii) any action asserting claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed 
by any director, officer, or other employee of the corporation to the corporation or 
the corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim arising pursuant 
to any provision of the DGCL, or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the 
internal affairs doctrine. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring 
any interest in shares of capital stock of the corporation shall be deemed to have 
notice of and consented to the provisions of this Article VII, Paragraph D. 
The Oracle clause was the simplest. It encompassed all 
derivative actions and required these to be litigated in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery.209 Netlist was similar, but bound 
the corporation to bring all actions against its directors and 
officers in the Delaware Court of Chancery, or, if the Chancery 
did not have jurisdiction, in Delaware state or federal court.210 
This seems to be a poorly worded option because it is not clear 
whether Netlist is attempting to follow Oracle in encompassing 
all derivative litigation or only circumstances in which the 
corporation itself sues a director or officer.  
Netsuite’s and Financial Engines’ clauses were more complex 
and much broader than the language in either the Gibson Dunn 
cluster or the Oracle clause. Instead of covering only derivative 
actions as the previous clauses had done, the Netsuite/Financial 
Engines language covered both derivative actions and claims in 
which the Delaware courts would have a competitive advantage 
over other courts in applying Delaware law.211 The difference 
between Netsuite’s and Financial Engines’ language, however, 
was the choice made between mandatory forum selection in the 
Netsuite clause and elective forum selection in Financial 
Engines.212 The advantages and disadvantages of these options 
will be evaluated later.213 
                                                                                                     
 209. See Oracle, Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, § 9.07) (Jul. 14, 2006). 
 210. See Netlist, Inc., Bylaws (Form S-1, § 5.12) (Oct. 23, 2006). 
 211. See Grundfest, supra note 62, at 16 (noting that “each state has a 
competitive advantage over other state courts in interpreting its own state’s 
law”). 
 212. Compare Netsuite, Inc., Bylaw (Form 8-K, art. 8) (Dec. 26, 2009) 
(“Delaware shall be the sole and exclusive forum . . . .”), with Financial Engines, 
Inc., Charter (Form 10-Q, art. D) (Dec. 9, 2009) (“Unless the corporation 
consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and exclusive forum . . . .”). 
 213. See infra Part III.E.2. 
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After Revlon was decided on March 16, 2010, forum selection 
clauses proliferated.214 Grundfest divides these clauses into the 




Unless the Corporation (through approval of the Board of Directors) 
consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the Court 
of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and exclusive 
forum for (i) any actual or purported derivative action or proceeding 
brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim 
of breach of fiduciary duty owed by any director or officer of the 
Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, 
(iii) any action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of 
the GCL, (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal 
affairs doctrine. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise 
acquiring any interest in shares of capital stock of the Corporation 
shall be deemed to have notice of and to have consented to the 





Unless the Corporation otherwise consents to an alternative forum in 
writing, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the 
sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding 
brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim 
of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director or officer of the 
Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, 
(iii) any action asserting a claim against the Corporation arising 
pursuant to any provision of the DGCL or the Corporation’s Certificate 
of Incorporation or By-Laws or (iv) any action asserting a claim against 
the Corporation governed by the internal affairs doctrine. Any person 
or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of 
capital stock of the Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and 
consented to the provisions of this Article THIRTEENTH.  
Pillsbury 
cluster 
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an 
alternative forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware 
shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or 
proceeding bought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action 
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, 
officer, or other employee of the Corporation to the Corporation or the 
Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim arising 
pursuant to any provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs 
doctrine. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any 
interest in shares of capital stock of the Corporation shall be deemed to 
have notice of and consented to the provisions of this Article VII. 
                                                                                                     
 214. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 215. Grundfest, supra note 62, at 5. The Grundfest cluster consists 
exclusively of limited partnerships and limited liability companies, and thus will 
not be discussed in this Note. 
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Simpson 
cluster 
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an 
alternative forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware 
shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or 
proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action 
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, 
officer, employee or agent of the Corporation to the Corporation or the 
Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim arising 
pursuant to any provision of the DGCL, or (iv) any action asserting a 
claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine, in each such case 
subject to said Court of Chancery having personal jurisdiction over the 
indispensable parties named as defendants therein. Any person or 
entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of 
capital stock of the corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and 
consented to the provisions of this Article X. 
K&E cluster The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and 
exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on 
behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of 
a fiduciary duty owed by any director or officer of the Corporation to 
the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action 
asserting a claim against the Corporation arising pursuant to any 
provision of the CGL or this Certificate or Incorporation or the 
Corporation’s Bylaws or (iv) any action asserting a claim against the 
Corporation governed by the internal affairs doctrine. 
The Skadden cluster216 mainly tracks the elective Financial 
Engine language, but with two notable exceptions. Swift 
Transportation chose to include claims arising under the 
corporation’s certificate of incorporation and bylaws as well as 
those arising under the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(DGCL).217 All three clauses in the Skadden cluster assert that 
holders of corporate stock are deemed to have notice of the forum 
selection provision.218 
Like the Skadden cluster, the Pillsbury cluster219 tracks the 
elective Financial Engines language and adds a notice clause, but 
unlike the Skadden cluster, does not include claims arising under 
the certificate of incorporation or bylaws.220 
                                                                                                     
 216. The Skadden cluster includes Swift Transportation Co., Primerica, and 
Liberty Mutual. Grundfest, supra note 62, at 4. 
 217. Swift Transp. Co., Charter (Form 10-K, art. 13) (Mar. 29, 2011). This 
language was not followed by Primerica or Liberty Mutual’s clauses. 
 218. See, e.g., id. 
 219. The Pillsbury cluster includes Inphi Corporation, Meru Networks, Inc., 
and Chevron Corporation. Grundfest, supra note 62, at 4. 
 220. See, e.g., Inphi Corp., Charter (Form 10-K, art. D) (Mar. 7, 2011). 
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The Simpson cluster221 also tracks the elective Financial 
Engines language and, like both Skadden and Pillsbury, adds a 
notice clause. In addition, it provides that the forum selection 
clause shall not be binding unless “the Court of Chancery has 
personal jurisdiction over the indispensable parties named as 
defendants therein.”222 
The K&E cluster223 follows the mandatory Netsuite language, 
except that—like the Skadden cluster—it governs actions 
asserting a claim arising from the corporation’s certification of 
incorporation or bylaws.224 
E. Content of Forum Selection Clauses 
1. Claims Covered by a Forum Selection Clause 
For a company interested in adopting (or a corporate 
attorney who will be advising clients about) a forum selection 
clause, the first consideration is the coverage of the clause. As 
seen in the Oracle, Netlist, Netsuite, and Financial Engines 
clauses, a forum selection clause can be written to cover directors, 
employees, shareholders, or any combination of these.225 Allen 
identified four categories of actions generally covered by forum 
selection clauses. These categories overlap to a considerable 
degree, allowing what Allen characterizes as a “belt and 
suspenders” approach.226 The first is any derivative action or 
proceeding brought on behalf of the corporation.227 While this 
would cover the majority of the claims against a corporation, it 
would arguably not cover nonfiduciary duty claims and would 
certainly not cover claims asserted against the corporations by 
                                                                                                     
 221. The Simpson cluster includes LPL Investment Holdings, Inc. and 
FXCM, Inc. Grundfest, supra note 62, at 4. 
 222.  See, e.g., FXCM, Inc., Charter (Form S-1, § 10.1) (Dec. 1, 2010). 
 223. The K&E cluster includes Charter Communications, Inc., Chemtura 
Corp., and Gordmans Stores, Inc. Grundfest, supra note 62, at 4. 
 224. See, e.g., Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Charter (Form 8-K, art. 11) (Aug. 20, 
2010) (following the Netsuite language, but adding “or this Certificate of 
Incorporation or the Corporation’s Bylaws” to the third subsection). 
 225. See supra Figure 2. 
 226. See Allen, supra note 3, at 4. 
 227. Id. at 3. 
THE POWER OF A SUGGESTION 2111 
shareholders, directors, or employees individually. Allowing 
plaintiffs to escape the forum selection clause by characterizing 
the action as something other than a derivative action seems 
unwise for a corporation undergoing the trouble to adopt a forum 
selection clause. While covering derivative actions may be a good 
start, forum selection clauses should include something more. 
The second category covers any action asserting a claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty owed by any director or officer to the 
corporation or its stockholders.228 This is more tailored than the 
first category and can be expanded to fiduciary duties owed by 
employees229 or agents or advisors.230 
The third and fourth categories are in line with the policy 
advocated by this Note. The third category covers any action 
asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the 
DGCL.231 This category aligns with the reality that each state has 
a competitive advantage in deciding matters involving its own 
law.232 The fourth category covers any claim governed by the 
internal affairs doctrine.233 This would have the blanket effect of 
requiring each state to decide claims governed by its own law and 
dismiss those that are not. 
In addition, some companies have added other limiting 
factors designed to increase the equity of restricting forum and 
eliminating cases in which the court may be particularly willing 
to prevent an unfair forum restriction. This Note will discuss two 
of the most useful of these provisions.234 The first provision is an 
                                                                                                     
 228. Id. 
 229. See id. (finding 59.5% (116) of forum selection clauses in this category 
have also addressed fiduciary duties owed by employees). 
 230. See id. (finding that 15.4% (30) of forum selection clauses in this 
category have also addressed fiduciary duties owed by agents or advisors of the 
corporation). 
 231. See id. at 4. 
 232. See Grundfest, supra note 62, at 16 (noting a competitive advantage for 
each state court in deciding that state’s law). 
 233. Allen, supra note 3, at 4. 
 234. The author is aware of three other special provisions, each of which 
simply follows existing law and is not particularly necessary or helpful. The first 
is an exception to the application of the Delaware forum selection clause when a 
federal court has assumed exclusive jurisdiction of a proceeding. Latham & 
Watkins, supra note 178, at 3. The second provision provides for the Delaware 
Chancery Court to be the exclusive forum “to the fullest extent” permitted by 
law. Allen, supra note 3, at 8. The third is a provision providing that any person 
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exception to application of the forum selection provision when the 
court of the chosen forum has determined that an indispensable 
party is not subject to the jurisdiction of that court. Forty-eight 
(24.6%) corporations with forum selection clauses included this 
provision.235 This provision helps to prevent clearly unfair 
situations in which a plaintiff cannot obtain complete redress, 
and a court might be willing to decline to enforce the forum 
selection provision in that circumstance because it prevents the 
plaintiff from having his day in court.236 While useful in 
restricting forum selection clauses to their legal limit, this 
provision should only encompass those situations in which it is 
possible to join the indispensible party in another jurisdiction.237 
Currently, only one corporation has adopted this language.238 
Another useful provision would be language disclaiming 
retroactive application of the forum selection clause to acts or 
omissions occurring before adoption. This language responds to 
the Galaviz court’s concern about the retroactive effect of Oracle’s 
                                                                                                     
or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in the corporation shall 
be deemed to have notice of and consent to the forum selection clause. Latham & 
Watkins, supra note 178, at 2. This merely follows case law concerning 
corporate governance documents. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 
953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del. 2008) (“Bylaws, by their very nature, set down rules and 
procedures that bind a corporation’s board and its shareholders.”). 
 235. Allen, supra note 3, at 8. 
 236. See Argueta v. Banco Mexicano S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 325 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that a court should decline to enforce the forum selection clause if doing 
so would prevent the plaintiff from having his day in court); see also Ingres 
Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1145 (Del. 2010) (holding that the court will 
decline to enforce the forum selection clause if doing so would be “unreasonable 
and unjust”). 
 237. See Latham & Watkins, supra note 178, at 3 (advocating this 
limitation). 
 238. See Avid Technology, Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, art. 17, § 1) (Oct. 21, 
2011) (including an exemption for case in which a indispensable party could not 
be joined in Delaware or when a federal court has exclusive jurisdiction). The 
Avid Technology clause reads:  
[P]rovided that the foregoing provision shall not apply in the 
event that (a) the action could not be brought in the Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware because of the inability to 
join an indispensable party, which party could be joined in the 
action in another form, or (b) a United States federal court has 
properly assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the action.  
Id. 
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bylaw forum selection clause.239 Currently, Boeing Company is 
the only corporation to include this provision,240 although one 
other company stated in its amendment proposal that adoption of 
the forum selection clause would have no effect on pending 
derivative proceedings.241 
2. Mandatory or Elective Provision 
The second consideration is whether to choose a mandatory 
or elective provision. A mandatory forum selection clause 
requires the plaintiff to bring the action in the jurisdiction 
selected by the corporation, while an elective forum selection 
clause allows the corporation to consent in writing to the 
plaintiff’s choice if it sees some advantage to defending in that 
jurisdiction.242 The initial forum selection clauses in the Gibson 
Dunn cluster and by Oracle and Netlist were mandatory, but, 
starting with Netsuite and Financial Engines, the elective 
provision became an established option.243 Currently, 56.1% of 
Delaware corporations with a forum selection clause specify that 
the corporation may consent in writing to the selection of an 
alternative forum.244 To many corporations, elective forum 
selection clauses are an attractive option because they offer a 
“heads I win, tails you lose” alternative. If the selected forum is 
deemed to be in the company’s best interest, it will enforce the 
clause. If, however, the forum in which the plaintiff brings the 
lawsuit is perceived to be more favorable to the defendant 
                                                                                                     
 239. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“A 
bylaw unilaterally adopted by directors, however, stands on a different footing. 
Particularly where, as here, the bylaw was adopted by the very individuals who 
are named as defendants, and after the alleged wrongdoing took place . . . .”). 
 240. The Boeing Co., Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, art. VII, § 5) (Oct. 4, 2011) 
(“With respect to any action arising out of any act or omission occurring after 
the adoption of this By-Law. . . .”). 
 241. Allen, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that InsWeb Corporation included this 
disclosure in its charter amendment proposal). 
 242. See Grundfest, supra note 62, at 6.  
 243. See id. at 5 (distinguishing between mandatory and elective forum 
selection clauses); see also Allen 2011, supra note 65, at vi (noting that the 
percentage of elective forum clauses has risen from 30.8% in July 2010 to 56.1% 
in August 2011). 
 244. Allen, supra note 3, at 8. 
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company than the jurisdiction selected by the forum selection 
clause, the company can consent to the alternative forum in 
writing and defend there.  
While the upside is great for a corporation with an elective 
forum selection clause, there is some downside risk as well. With 
Galaviz being the only major case on point outside of Delaware, 
the enforceability of forum selection clauses in general is 
uncertain, and a court may be more willing take policy into 
account when deciding the enforceability of a forum selection 
clause. When a lawyer seeking to uphold a forum selection clause 
is required not only to argue the policy behind forum selection 
clause in general but also to support an elective provision, he may 
have an impossible task in convincing a judge who sees an 
elective forum selection clause as too advantageous to the 
corporation. The plaintiff will argue that an elective forum 
selection clause allows the corporation to forum shop while 
preventing the plaintiff–shareholder from doing the same.245 
While this is not an exceedingly persuasive argument, the 
advantages of an elective forum selection clause246 do not seem to 
outweigh the risks. 
3. Charter or Bylaws 
The final decision that an advocate of a forum selection 
clause must make is whether to place the clause in the corporate 
charter or bylaws. Charters of Delaware corporations are 
governed by DGCL § 102. Section 102(b)(1) authorizes 
corporations to include in their charters: 
(1) Any provision for the management of the business and for 
the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision 
creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the 
corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of 
                                                                                                     
 245. See Latham & Watkins, supra note 178, at 3 (discussing this 
argument). 
 246. The advantages of an elective clause seem few. A corporation might be 
willing to allow the plaintiff to continue the action if the action is in a favorable 
jurisdiction to the defendant. If, however, the jurisdiction were favorable to the 
defendant, why would the plaintiff bring the action there? In an adversarial 
system in which any benefit to the plaintiff is a detriment to the defendant, the 
benefit of an elective forum selection clause seems minimal. 
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the stockholders, or the governing body, members, or any class 
or group of members of a nonstock corporation; if such 
provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State.247 
Due to the broad nature of § 102(b)(1), corporations have wide-
ranging authority to insert in the charter of the corporation what 
its directors and shareholders deem appropriate, and this would 
include inserting a forum selection clause. Charter provisions are 
binding on all shareholders, whether or not they voted for the 
provisions or whether or not they owned stock prior to the 
adoption of the provision.248 
In deciding between charter and bylaw provisions, there are 
several risks and rewards that a corporation must balance. 
Courts agree that charter forum selection provisions, without 
exceptional circumstances, are going to be upheld. Even when 
striking the forum selection clause at issue, the Galaviz court 
noted: “Certainly were a majority of shareholders to approve such 
a charter amendment, the arguments for treating the venue 
provision like those in commercial contracts would be much 
stronger, even in the case of a plaintiff shareholder who had 
personally voted against the amendment.”249 Combining this 
statement with the Galaviz court’s analysis of the dispute as a 
contract case under M/S Bremen and Carnival Cruise, one would 
predict that that court would likely have enforced a charter 
provision that was approved by the shareholders, even while it 
refused to uphold a bylaw provision passed by the board of 
directors. 
Even Revlon does not expressly mention bylaw forum 
selection clauses but speaks of “charter provisions selecting an 
exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”250 It does, however, 
mention Oracle’s bylaw forum selection clause and approve this 
possibility, at least by implication.251 
                                                                                                     
 247. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(1) (2011). 
 248. See Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 
(Del. 1990) (“Corporate charters and by-laws are contracts among the 
shareholders of a corporation and the general rules of contract interpretation 
are held to apply.”). 
 249. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 250. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 251. Id. at 960 n.8. 
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With great reward, however, comes great risk. Shareholders may 
be unwilling to affirmatively vote in favor of a charter forum selection 
provision limiting their right to sue in the most advantageous forum 
available. For example, Allstate Corporation’s recent attempt to place 
a forum selection clause in its charter gained support from only 41.7% 
of shareholders.252 There are several ways that the corporation can 
persuade reluctant shareholders. The corporation can start by 
explaining the benefits to shareholders as a class. These include 
(1) avoiding the possibility of costly duplicative litigation and (2) the 
possibility of conflicting outcomes in different jurisdictions in the 
same case, both of which lead to money saved through decreased 
litigation expenses by the clause (and presumably distributed as 
dividends or invested back into the company which would increase 
the stock value). The corporation could also bundle the forum 
selection clause with shareholder-friendly proposals, as Life 
Technology Corporation did when it bundled a board declassification 
amendment with a forum selection clause.253 
Bylaw forum selection clauses, on the other hand, are relatively 
easy to adopt as long as the board of directors has the authority to 
pass bylaws under the charter.254 As is the case with charters, the 
DGCL has a sweeping bylaw statute. DGCL § 109(b) states: “The 
bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with 
the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the 
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the 
rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or 
employees.”255 In a typical corporation that provides notice that the 
bylaws may be amended at any time, bylaws can be amended by the 
board of directors without shareholder consent and are binding on the 
shareholders.256 This eliminates the possibility of shareholder 
rejection that is present in charter proposals, as occurred at 
                                                                                                     
 252. Allen, supra note 3, at 5. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its 
certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws 
upon the directors . . . .”). 
 255. Id. 
 256. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del. 
2008) (“Bylaws, by their very nature, set down rules and procedures that bind a 
corporation’s board and its shareholders.”). 
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Allstate.257 As long as a majority of the board of directors agrees on 
the need to pass a forum selection clause, which would be 
required to pass a charter provision anyway, the clause will be 
adopted. 
The upside of the bylaw provision is also its downside. In 
Galaviz, the only case directly on point, the court refused to 
enforce a board-adopted bylaw forum selection clause and 
supported its holding by pointing to the unilateral way in which 
the clause was adopted. Analogizing the clause to a commercial 
contract, the court noted: “Here, in contrast, the venue provision 
was unilaterally adopted by the directors who are defendants in 
this action, after the majority of the purported wrongdoing is 
alleged to have occurred, and without the consent of existing 
shareholders who acquired their shares when no such bylaw was 
in effect.”258 In distinguishing Carnival Cruise, the court made 
much of the bilateral agreement that contained the forum 
selection clause in Carnival Cruise, and emphasized the absence 
of a bilateral agreement in the case before it.259 If other courts 
follow the Galaviz court in applying a contractual analysis to 
bylaw clauses, they could strike down these clauses with 
regularity. 
While bylaw clauses offer easy adoptability, their 
enforceability is uncertain with Galaviz as the only case squarely 
on point. If a court does decline to enforce a corporation’s bylaw 
clause, the only thing that a corporation gains from the adoption 
is debts from litigating the disputed clause and additional 
unfavorable precedent. In addition, the corporation is unlikely to 
be able to pass a charter forum selection clause when its bylaw 
clause has been struck down by the courts. 
Charter clauses, on the other hand, are much more likely to 
be enforced by the courts under the contractual approach taken 
by Galaviz.260 They are bilateral agreements voted upon by the 
                                                                                                     
 257. Allen, supra note 3, at 5. 
 258. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 259. See id. (“Under contract law, a party’s consent to a written agreement 
may serve as consent to all the terms therein, whether or not all of them were 
specifically negotiated or even read, but it does not follow that a contracting 
party may thereafter unilaterally add or modify contractual provisions.”). 
 260. See id. 
Modern federal law plainly favors the enforcement of 
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board of directors (acting for the company) and the shareholders 
(acting for themselves). A corporation that can fit the adoption of 
its forum selection clause into a bilateral contract approach will 
be almost certain to have it upheld under a Carnival Cruise 
analysis.261 
4. Proposed Forum Selection Clause 
The best forum selection clause depends on the current 
situation of the corporation adopting one. If the corporation is in 
transition, such as being on the verge of an IPO, emerging out of 
bankruptcy, or reincorporating in Delaware, it should adopt a 
charter amendment that reads: 
The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be262 the 
sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or 
proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action 
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any 
director or officer of the Corporation to the Corporation or to 
the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a 
claim against the Corporation arising pursuant to any 
provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law or the 
Corporation’s Certificate of Incorporation or By-Laws, or 
(iv) any action asserting a claim against the Corporation 
governed by the internal affairs doctrine;263 provided that the 
foregoing provision shall not apply in the event that (a) the 
action could not be brought in the Court of Chancery of the 
State of Delaware because of the inability to join an 
indispensable party, which party could be joined in the action 
                                                                                                     
contractual venue clauses, but even in the case of a form 
contract, a court merely gives effect to a bilateral agreement 
between the parties that any disputes they may have arising out 
of that agreement will be litigated in a particular forum. 
 261. See Carnival Cruise Line, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991). This 
is assuming, of course, that the corporation does not engage in actions that 
would cause a court to find the clause void for violating Carnival Cruise’s 
fundamental fairness test. 
 262. This Note advocates use of a mandatory forum selection clause for 
reasons discussed earlier in Part III.E.2. 
 263. This Note advocates use of all four categories discussed earlier in Part 
III.E.1, including the Swift Transportation addition of “or the Corporation’s 
Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws.” 
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in another forum, or (b) a United States federal court has 
properly assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the action.264 
For a public corporation, there are many possible routes, ranging 
from adoption by the board of directors of a bylaw forum selection 
clause to a charter amendment with a forum selection clause. As 
long as its board of directors has the authority to adopt bylaws,265 
it could unilaterally adopt a bylaw forum selection clause, but the 
board must acknowledge the possibility that this provision may 
not be enforced by the courts, as happened to Oracle in Galaviz. If 
a corporation chooses this route, it should include the language in 
Boeing’s clause disclaiming retroactive effect in an effort to avoid 
a court following Galaviz in striking it down as a unilateral 
amendment to a contract.266  
There are two other options for a corporation not interested 
in the arduous task of passing a charter amendment. First, a 
board of directors can pass a bylaw forum selection clause and, at 
the shareholders’ next meeting, propose that the shareholders 
ratify the directors’ actions. This is similar to a charter 
amendment, but has the benefit of only requiring a majority of 
the shareholders present at the meeting rather than a majority of 
all shares outstanding.267 A ratified bylaw clause would also 
address the Galaviz court’s concern about a bilateral contract.268 
                                                                                                     
 264. This proposed clause tracks the language of Avid Corporation’s forum 
selection clause, which is the most comprehensive language of any forum 
selection clause. See Avid Technology, Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, art. 17, § 1) (Oct. 
21, 2011). 
 265. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2011) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its 
certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws 
upon the directors.”). 
 266. See The Boeing Co., Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, art. VII, § 5) (Oct. 4, 2011) 
(“With respect to any action arising out of any act or omission occurring after 
the adoption of this By-Law . . . .”). 
 267. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2011) (stating that default 
quorum to amend corporation’s bylaws is a simple majority of those present at 
the shareholders’ meeting and a bylaw is passed with the approval of a majority 
of those present), with id. § 242 (requiring an affirmative vote of “a majority of 
the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon” in order to pass a charter 
amendment). 
 268. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“[A] 
court merely gives effect to a bilateral agreement between the parties that any 
disputes they may have arising out of that agreement will be litigated in a 
particular forum.”). 
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Alternatively, a board of directors can pass a bylaw forum 
selection clause while asking that the shareholders vote at the 
next shareholders’ meeting on a proposal to repeal this bylaw. 
This allows the board to claim the status quo and allows the 
bylaw clause to proceed without affirmative shareholder action. It 
is uncertain, however, how the courts would react to what is 
essentially affirmation by inaction. 
A third alternative that the board of directors can take is to 
propose a shareholder bylaw with a forum selection clause. This 
takes advantage of the lesser voting requirements under 
Delaware law for passing a bylaw rather than a charter 
amendment,269 but has the contractual element required by 
Galaviz. 
If a corporation is more concerned about enforcement of the 
forum selection clause than ease of adoptability, it should propose 
a charter amendment adding a forum selection clause. While the 
amendment must be approved by a majority of the shares 
outstanding,270 the corporation can bundle the forum selection 
clause with other provisions to encourage adoption. Even without 
bundling, companies have had a high success rate when they put 
the issue to the shareholders.271 If a corporation is able to pass a 
charter amendment, it is assured of enforcement. 
IV. Conclusion 
The need for forum selection clauses is driven by the 
proliferation of duplicative litigation over corporate transactions 
and alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. It has become 
increasingly common for a corporation to be required to defend 
                                                                                                     
 269. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2011) (stating that default 
quorum to amend corporation’s bylaws is a simple majority of those present at 
the shareholders’ meeting and a bylaw is passed with the approval of a majority 
of those present), with id. § 242 (requiring an affirmative vote of “a majority of 
the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon” in order to pass a charter 
amendment). 
 270. See id. § 242 (requiring an affirmative vote of “a majority of the 
outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon” in order to pass a charter 
amendment). 
 271. See Allen, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that, of the six corporations that 
proposed charter amendments, five succeeded); see also supra notes 252–53 and 
accompanying text (discussing these six corporations). 
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several different suits in multiple forums. This costs corporations 
additional litigation expenses that only benefit the additional 
lawyers required to litigate the duplicative actions. Not only does 
this harm corporations, it also harms society in general which 
purchases stock in the corporation and must pay for the judicial 
resources required in each action. The IAD and forum non 
conveniens, while useful in controlling duplicative litigation, do 
not adequately prevent this problem because neither jurisdiction 
is required to defer to the other. 
This Note has proposed that corporations adopt forum 
selection clauses in their governing documents. As the Supreme 
Court noted: forum selection clauses “establishing ex ante the 
forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of dispelling 
any confusion about where suits . . . must be brought and 
defended.”272 A corporation adopting a forum selection clause has 
many choices to make: which claims to include, mandatory or 
elective selection of forum, insertion into its charter or bylaw, and 
whether to include exceptions to the general rule in the absence 
of an indispensible party or for other specific circumstances. 
Through these choices, a corporation can craft a forum selection 
clause that best meets the company’s needs. A forum selection 
clause provides assurance to a corporation that, while it may be 
required to defend against litigation in one jurisdiction, it will not 
be forced to defend against the same claim in multiple forums. 
Appendix 1: Characteristics of the Prominent Forum 
Selection Clauses 





“any action brought by any stockholder against 
the Corporation or against any office, director, 
employee, agent or advisor of the Corporation.” 
Mandatory Bylaw 
Oracle, Inc. 
“any actual or purported derivative action 
brought on behalf of the Corporation.” Mandatory Bylaw 
Netlist, Inc. 
“any lawsuit or legal proceeding by the 
corporation against any of its directors or 
officers within the jurisdiction of [the Delaware 
Chancery Court].” 
Mandatory Bylaw 
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Netsuite, Inc. 
“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought 
on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action 
asserting a claim of a fiduciary duty owed by any 
director, officer or employee of the Corporation 
to the Corporation or the Corporation’s 
stockholders (iii) any action asserting a claim 
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL, 
(iv) or any action asserting a claim governed by 




“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought 
on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action 
asserting a claim of a fiduciary duty owed by any 
director, officer or employee of the Corporation 
to the Corporation or the Corporation’s 
stockholders (iii) any action asserting a claim 
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL, 
(iv) or any action asserting a claim governed by 




“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought 
on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action 
asserting a claim of a fiduciary duty owed by any 
director, officer or employee of the Corporation 
to the Corporation or the Corporation’s 
stockholders (iii) any action asserting a claim 
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL, 
(iv) or any action asserting a claim governed by 






“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought 
on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action 
asserting claim of breach of a fiduciary duty 
owed by any director or officer of the 
Corporation to the Corporation or the 
Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action 
asserting a claim against the Corporation 
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL 
or the Corporation’s Certificate of Incorporation 
or By-Laws or (iv) any action asserting a claim 
against the Corporation governed by the 




“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought 
on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action 
asserting claim of breach of a fiduciary duty 
owed by any director or officer of the 
Corporation to the Corporation or the 
Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action 
asserting a claim against the Corporation 
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL 
or (iv) any action asserting a claim against the 
Corporation governed by the internal affairs 
doctrine.” 
Elective Bylaw 
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  Simpson 
cluster 
“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought 
on behalf of the Corporation, any action 
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty 
owed by any director, officer or other employee 
of the Corporation to the Corporation or the 
Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action 
asserting a claim against the Corporation 
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL 
or the Corporation’s Amendment and Restated 
Certificate of Incorporation or bylaws or (iv) any 
action asserting a claim against the Corporation 
governed by the internal affairs doctrine.” 
Mandatory Charter 
K&E cluster 
“(i) any derivative action or proceeding brought 
on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action 
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty 
owed by any director or officer of the 
Corporation to the Corporation or the 
Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action 
asserting a claim against the Corporation to the 
Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, 
(iv) any action asserting a claim against the 
Corporation arising pursuant to any provision of 
the GCL or this Certificate of Incorporation or 
the Corporation’s Bylaws or (v) any action 
asserting a claim against the Corporation 
governed by the internal affairs doctrine.” 
Mandatory Charter 
 
  
